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# **Ghana Social Science Journal**

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# **ACADEMIC CAPITALISM: GLOBALIZATION, UNIVERSITIES AND THE PARADOX OF THE NEOLIBERAL MARKETPLACE**

**James Dzisah<sup>1</sup>**

## **Abstract**

The concept and practice of globalization have not only impacted countries in a variety of ways but have equally induced strong emotions across varying spectrums. As a concept, the fingerprint of Karl Marx and his adherents remains in their recognition of the vitality of transnational trade and the exploitative tendencies inherent in capitalism as a world system. In recent decades however, the concept of globalization has resurfaced in the capitalist toolkit of neoliberalism where it is deployed in promoting their self-centered capitalistic annihilation in all spheres. The paper assesses the connection between universities and globalization in terms of the increasing market-oriented approach to knowledge production. It argues that though the process of globalization has influenced the conduct of knowledge production in a variety of expected and unexpected ways, the transformation of aspects of the university has equally left visible imprints on the modicums of globalization.

**Keywords:** Globalization, Knowledge Production, Universities, Triple Helix, Neoliberal Marketplace

## **Introduction**

Globalization as a concept and a process has created new challenges for both developed and developing economies, and induces strong emotions across varying spectrums. As a concept, though the fingerprint of Karl

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Marx and his adherents remains in their recognition of the vitality and exploitative tendencies of capitalism, the concept has resurfaced in the capitalist toolkit of neoliberal capitalism in recent decades. For the neoliberal capitalist, there are no credible alternatives to the process (Harvey, 2005). In spite of their posturing, one does not have to acknowledge the false narrative of neoliberalism to recognize the fact that the process is real and not simple flights of fancy (Baber, 2008; Held and McGrew, 2007).

In fact, within the contemporary sociological literature, profound analyses of the globalization process abound. The core analyses of interest to this paper are those which link the process to the impact of flows based on technoscience (Castells, 1996, 1997 and 1998) and the reconfiguration of time and space (Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1989). The emergence of both time and space as core analytical concepts could be described as a kind of sociological rediscovery since sociology has long ceded the analysis of ‘time’ to history and the theoretical relevance of ‘space’ to social geography (Friedland and Boden, 1994; Pries, 1999; Urry, 2001; Kivisto, 2003). The specific exception is the spattered but discernible references to the theoretical significance of ‘space’ in relation to social interaction and group life by Georg Simmel (1971; Kivisto, 2003).

The ascendancy, in recent decades of globalization has brought increasing attention in the literature, albeit in varied ways, to delineating the process by which space contracts and time collapses. For Giddens (1990), reflexive modernity is characterized by dynamism, constant change and an increasing time-space distancing. For Harvey (1989, 1996 and 2009), ‘time–space compression’ is derived from the consideration of Marx’s claim that capitalism leads to the annihilation of space by time, and Heidegger’s angst about the implications of the shrinking of both time and space (Kivisto, 2003). On his part, Manuel Castells (1996, 1997 and 1998) develops an understanding of the salience of space in relation to place through the concept of the *space of flows*, that is, the “material organization of time-sharing social practices”

that work through “meaningful and routinized exchanges and interactions in the dominant social structures of society” (Castells, 2000: 442). By extension, the fluidity of computer circuits and the dramatic advances in technoscience anchor the global knowledge-based social order not only materially but in a timeless time manner. For Castells, timeless time characterizes the dominant processes in a knowledge-based society that is generally directed at compressing the occurrence of phenomena, aiming at instantaneity or random discontinuity in the sequence (Castells, 2004: 183). In essence, the simultaneity in social relations across space enables the global economy to function as a single unit in real time (Castells, 2000).

Consequently, the globalized space within which the transformation of universities and knowledge production occur is mutually reciprocal and contradictory (Dzisah and Etkowitz, 2012). Stated differently, the space of knowledge production and dissemination has become a contested terrain as it concurrently liberates and exploits within the overarching ambit of neoliberal capitalism. The concept of neoliberalism as used within the context of this paper follows David Harvey’s (2005) description of the term as a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an industrial framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade (Harvey 2005: 2). Although advocates of neoliberalism clearly see a role for the state in promoting the efficient operation of markets, the features typically associated with neoliberalism distinguish it from older liberal ideologies, which accepted that markets should be embedded in and subject to “a web of social and political constraints, including government regulation” (Harvey, 2005: 11). This contestation is evident as the economy becomes progressively knowledge-based, making most knowledge institutions docile to market permutations.

The underlying assumption lies in the unwavering faith of proponents that the social good of neoliberalism will be derived through the global reach and frequency of market transactions once human action is brought



under the dictates of the market (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberalization has become more than a timely strategy for the specific fiscal and other problems facing public universities. It is, in fact, an omnibus solution available to be employed when any opportunity arises and helps to define the problems of the university in the first place (Kleinman, Feinstein and Downey, 2012). Consequently, within this context, the texture and trajectory of globalization has become contested within the idealized spaces where once stood a venerated ivory tower.

However, it is the contention of this paper that in spite of the numerous ethical, real and potential conflicts of interest iterations imbued in the push for a political economy of knowledge, one must not merely assume that neoliberalism is unidirectional and beneficial under all circumstances. It is clear that the academic disciplines in biomedical, semiconductors, petrochemicals, biotechnology and telecommunications are at the forefront of the market paradox and seen as its vocal praise singers. While the critical social sciences do not appeal directly to the market, they are nevertheless leaving visible imprints on the texture and trajectory of the globalization process as they continue to document the persistent but unequal conditions within the university system and the larger society.

## **Globalization, Universities and the Knowledge-based Social Order**

While capitalism is characterized by its relentless expansion, always trying to overcome limits of time and space, it was only in the late twentieth century that the world economy was able to become truly global on the basis of the new infrastructure provided by information and communication technologies (Castells, [1996] 2000). This global economy is anchored in recent times within the neoliberal policy framework of deregulation and liberalization and implemented by governments and international institutions. This policy regime is now camouflaged under the label of ‘home grown’ policies, yet it is moored within the structural adjustment parameters. In the early version of structural adjustment which coincided in the 1990s with a shift from

labour-intensive and natural resource-based industry to innovation-driven growth, the tenor of the debate was constructed around the fanciful notion that ideas, information and intellectual capital (Drucker, 1993; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) will deliver us from all economic stagnation and squalor.

In the process, the traditional economic issues emphasizing the role of productivity in the 1960s and of quality and flexibility in the two decades that followed brought attention to knowledge and innovation as a third production factor besides labour and capital (Debackere, 2000). This globalizing tendency and its growing awareness are derived from the intricate nature of productivity and competitiveness as played out in the simulated scenes of knowledge-based capitalism (Castells, [1996] 2000). Contested as it may be, this in some quarters marks the beginning of the so-called knowledge economy that emerged in the last years of the twentieth century (Castells, 2000:135), marking a break in continuity with earlier periods (David and Foray 2002). The critical mechanism of a knowledge economy includes a “greater reliance on intellectual capabilities rather than on physical inputs or natural resources” (Powell and Snellman, 2004:201). The argument is not that the global knowledge economy emerges out of thin air. It is an economy in the sense in which this term is used, but unlike the old international market where capital accumulation proceeds throughout the world, this economy is global and historically, a new reality. The global economy is distinct from a world economy upon which the international market principle was built. As Castells indicated, the distinctive feature of the global economy is that “it is an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale” (1996:92).

In fact, while this realization is not entirely new, as evident in the growing proportion of investments in the production and dissemination of knowledge and sustenance of the physical state of human capital (Abramovitz and David, 1996; David and Foray, 2002), it has nevertheless led to a growing demand among policy actors as to what policy combinations are critical to economic growth and prosperity. The

overriding policy question relates to how innovations in science and technology can and should be enhanced by policy decisions. The outcome, within the circles of the sociology of innovations, is the emergence of related approaches: *National Systems of Innovation* (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988); the *Mode 1—Mode 2 knowledge production* (Gibbons et al. 1994); the *Triple Helix of university–industry–government* interactions (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997); and the *Academic Capitalism* model (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). These conceptual schemes sought in varying ways to justify the intertwining of universities in the economy (Azagra-Caro et al., 2006). The major difference among these diverse approaches lies in the prominence granted to universities in the innovation process, though there is a consensus that a level of interaction with industry and government is germane.

Scholarly criticisms of these policy prescriptions are many and varied. Critics have denounced the simplicity of assuming power equivalency and extent to which knowledge capitalization is applicable across the larger university spectrum in different societies and jurisdictions. For instance, the economics of science approach recovers the Mertonian ideas that the mechanism of review by peers cannot efficiently assign R&D resources (Dasgupta and David, 1994; Eun, Lee and Wu, 2006). It also emphasizes that the promotion of university–industry relations responds to a narrow vision of the benefits of basic research (David et al., 1994; Azagra-Caro et al. 2006). In spite of this, no matter how one looks at the globalizing process or the penetrating impacts of neoliberalism, the fact remains that the emergence and growth of science-based technology and its intersection with independent institutional spheres started a transformation that had permeated knowledge producing institutions by the turn of the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Dzisah and Etzkowitz, 2012).

As the university gained autonomy from other social spheres, knowledge production began defying strict disciplinary demarcations by finding expression in boundary-spanning diachronic interactions that operate

under various guises, both public and private. The ultimate end game appears to be a policy move of picking winners, whereby there is a fusion of academic ideals and the virtues of the marketplace. In sociology, the seminal work of Jurgen Habermas (1970) and some members of the so-called ‘Edinburgh School’ of science studies—Barnes and MacKenzie (1979), Shapin (1979) and Pickering (1980)—provided fodder for a kind of self-defense that to a large extent, knowledge has always been asymmetrically organized around dominant interests specific to each social structure. This understanding enables critical observers to draw attention to the conflicting issues and opportunities embedded in knowledge production for the rigidities of academic life which dominates the academic landscape and for a much narrower parochial financial motivation via a tinged imitation of the beliefs of corporate greed (Greenberg, 2007).

Consequently, while the internal and external dimensions of institutional transformation continue to change, both organizationally and individually, there is an evolving interdisciplinarity space within the academia where knowledge production is increasingly conducted within vaguely defined neoliberal edges. However, the roles of universities, in spite of the visible signs of their overriding impact on neoliberal market values, are not directly articulated in much of the larger globalization literature (for exceptions, see authors such as Castells (1996); Harvey (1989); McMichael (2012); Sklair (2002) and Robinson (2001)), that deployed a historical materialist approach.

In spite of this, the degree of the changes taking place within the global political economy are said to be putting pressure on national higher education policy makers to change the way in which the business of tertiary education is conducted to fall in line with capitalist post-Fordist lean production methods (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). In this regard, globalization is identified as impacting higher education in a number of interrelated ways: the decline of government support; the growing centrality of technoscience and fields that are at the frontiers of the international markets; the tightening relationship between multinational

corporations and state agencies concerned with product development and innovation; and the increased focus on global intellectual property strategies (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997:37). Since the neoliberal model of globalization of the economy sees the market as the engine of growth, there is the expectation that all non-economic sectors must be brought under the dictates of the market. To achieve the neoliberal agenda, countries both developed and developing resorted to cost-cutting and cost-sharing measures, which resulted in significant budget cuts for higher education (Etzkowitz, 2002). It is true that though basic health-care and education are provided at a minimal cost in most jurisdictions, a critical assessment would, however, reveal that the real cost of service requires contribution or co-payment (Jordan, 2006). That is why these services are actually categorized as public-private partnerships.

While the mechanism for the transformation of the university into a market entity varies from country to country, it is often seen as a consequence of neoliberal capitalist ideology. This conception often overlooks the possibility that the global transformations in higher education may be due to the incidence of unequal transnationalization of capital circuits and classes (Castells, 1996; McMichael, 2012; Robinson, 2001). Granted as this may be, these transformations require new forms of institutional mediation in order to undertake accumulation. The global nature of accumulation demands that it be less contingent on the political authority of nation-states (Robinson, 2001). This is why the global managers of capital (IMF and the World Bank) became the major battleground for socio-economic and educational reforms in the 1980s and beyond (McMichael, 2012).

Nevertheless, during the latter part of the twentieth century, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberalism has become the common thread linking calls for public universities to be self-financing. The apparent link between the underlying neoliberal affinity and the drive to nudge public universities into the paradoxical neoliberal marketplace is succinctly captured by Judith Sutz:

The increasing demand for funds from universities and research institutes gets a similar response worldwide: support yourselves! That is to say, connect yourselves with industries and the government, offer your knowledge and your capacity to generate new knowledge, and charge for it. Only in this way will you be able to extend your laboratories, hire young people, and increase your salaries. Academia is financed by taxpayers, and they are entitled to know what the social return of their sacrifices will be. Nothing better, then, than show that what is done from the universities and research centres will be directly useful so that the country becomes stronger, so that more jobs are created etc. (1997:15).

While this message was almost universal, its tenor, context and emphasis were mediated by varying degrees of compromises within global and local corridors of power. The choice open to most universities was plain in some contexts; other than tuition fee hikes, the global market appears as a more attractive option, based on the manner in which it was rendered as having a therapeutic linctus even in the absence of serious diagnosis.

Also, the growing centrality of technoscience and fields closely involved with the market is one way through which globalization impacts higher education. There is an obvious link between universities and the market, whether through research and development or education and training which are seen as the medium through which technoscience is produced (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). The dawn of the knowledge economy provides the lure to many academic managers that the market may provide a critical source of revenue to substitute for the dwindling government subventions. The promise is very appealing to policymakers of all stripes since universities are in the business of producing knowledges that are simultaneously a science and a product. As Gary Pisano (2006) indicated, it is a 'science business' since it collapses the distinction between knowledge and commodity as exemplified by

biomedical, semiconductors, petrochemicals, biotechnology and telecommunications fields (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Sassen 1991; Kevles and Hood, 1992).

Again, as the gap between discovery and application has narrowed, government agencies and the market have heightened their activities of capitalizing knowledge by seeing universities as intellectual property sources (Slaughter, 1998). Consequently, within this context, globalization, especially its neoliberal version, became the standard bearer of the increasing policy push towards embracing the market-oriented policy regime to knowledge production by most institutions of higher education. In spite of this, it will be wrong to completely blame the free enterprise approach within universities at the doorstep of neoliberalism and pretend as if the phenomenon is a one-dimensional drift.

In fact, the trends towards the seeming adoption of corporate management styles by universities should not and cannot entirely be explained by invoking neoliberal ideology. This is because when approached in this way, we will be overlooking historical developments. As various critical analyses have shown, the production of unequal social opportunities has been a systematic but regular feature of the education system in most societies (Wotherspoon, 1995). These inequalities are found not only inside society but also in academic demarcations of public universities in terms of allocation of institutional resources, as well as the resource-endowment of individual faculties. Based on these factors, one can adequately assert that the process of globalization has influenced the conduct of knowledge production in a variety of expected and unexpected ways and that the transformations in knowledge production and the inherent academic capitalism mirror those of the larger society.

This notwithstanding, most critics of public education's apparent failure, a common cry in Ghana, tend to substitute a general dissatisfaction with formal educational establishments for a more sustained analysis of what

schools do and why they operate the way they do (Wotherspoon, 1995). It is clear that this stems from a misunderstanding of the history and practice of education and the naïve but “extreme faith in the ability of formal education systems either to overcome social and economic disparities or to match labour-force requirements” (Wotherspoon, 1995:485). The perception is that education systems alone should provide an efficient panacea for social and labour-market problems.

In addition, the emergence of the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’ in the 1980s and early 1990s provided the impetus for a heightened global competition, making it crucial for corporations and state agencies to work together to stimulate technoscience (Slaughter, 1998). Consequently, the gain in manufacturing by these countries and the loss by the advanced capitalist states resulted in calls for all sorts of educational reforms. Though these developments provided a cause for concern, the question that lingers is whether educational reforms alone would have provided the magic fix for declining competitiveness. As the Asian economic crisis that follows their rise to prominence has shown, educational reforms alone are not ends in themselves but transition points within which various knowledge producers have to adjust to global trends. For better or for worse, the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’ have provided the momentum for heightened global niche formation. As such, in the 1980s and 1990s most states in the developed world, regardless of the political party in power, pursued supply-side economic policies, shifting public resources and allocation of resources from social programs based on neoliberal market calculations (Slaughter, 1998).

In fact, as earlier indicated, leaders of corporations, governments, and tertiary educational institutions increasingly see universities as possible intellectual property sources, a clear departure from the seminal Mertonian ‘ethos of science’ within which scientific knowledge was discovered under suitable social conditions such as ‘universalism’, ‘disinterestedness’, ‘organized skepticism’ and ‘communism’ (Merton, 1973: 270). The effects are that, within the neoliberal market-oriented space, universities are valuable not only within the context of



enlightening minds and producing socially valued knowledge, but more valuable as producers of market-based values and credentials. Within the context of Ghana, the social pronouncement of credentials has been taken over by the mushrooming media, though the universities are still active within this space. The universities as leading producers of technoscience provide credence to the neoliberal market-based policies on the one hand, and on the other hand the market-based values and credentialed domains provide the anchor to link globalization to higher education. Consequently, universities have, within this realm, left some visible imprints on the texture and trajectory of globalization.

### **Knowledge as both Public and Private Capital**

Knowledge, like the foremost institutions—the universities, is deeply rooted in a conflict. As Delanty (2001 and 2002) intimated, knowledge is not simply self-producing but occurs in a social and cultural context. For the avoidance of doubt, there is conflict between knowledge as science and knowledge as culture (Delanty, 2001; 2002), even though for years universities were largely conceived as autonomous zones of free inquiry, protected from the incursions of religious and political censors (Huff, 2006). At the dawn of the twentieth century, the modern university with research inclinations emerged with different permutations, making some versions critically attuned towards the neoliberal marketplace while the more conservative ones persevere with the status quo, where efforts are always directed at preserving the university space for the elite.

In fact, fundamental to what early critics saw to be in peril due to the commercial considerations of knowledge was the autonomy of scientific practice couched in Weberian schema by Michael Polanyi (1962) as the ‘Republic of Science’ (Kleinman and Vallas, 2001:456). Polanyi defined the autonomy of science as existing when the “choice of subjects and the actual conduct of research is entirely the responsibility of the individual scientists, [and] the recognition of claims to discoveries is under the jurisdiction of scientific opinion expressed by scientists” (1962:54). This ideal paralleled Merton’s ([1942] 1973) normative structure of science postulations. However, with the growth of the scientific enterprise

through research grants and research funding institutions there was a divorce of ‘pure science’ from ‘applied science’ at the ideological level. This divorce is, nonetheless, negated at the project management levels (Brown and Schubert, 2002).

The autonomy of scientific fields to produce new knowledge and their utility are dialectically symbiotic (Brown and Schubert, 2002). As such, within the context of knowledge as a duality, that is viewing knowledge as imbued with both public and private qualities, resonate sociologically within the broader theoretical frame of Anthony Giddens (1984) and Nico Stehr (1994). For Giddens (1984), “structural properties of social systems are both the medium as well as the outcome of the practices, which they recursively organize” (1984:25). The duality of structure implies that structure is not amazingly external to humans but caught up in their behaviour and knowledgeability (Hagendijk, 1990).

Similarly, Stehr (1994) details the range and the forms of knowledge that science makes available as expanding dramatically. For Stehr (1994), the zero-sum quality of knowledge makes it a public good in the sense that knowledge “enters other domains but still remains within the domain of the producer” (Stehr, 1994:94). This implies that knowledge is often seen as a collective commodity *par excellence*. For instance, the ethos of science demands, at least in principle, that it be made available to all (Merton, 1973). It must, however, be stressed that knowledge is practically on no account, regardless of its character, unchallenged. In science, the contestability of knowledge is often seen as a sign of one of its prime virtues (Stehr, 1994). As Simmel ([1907] 1978:438) argued, the contested character of knowledge in practical circumstances is often repressed and/or conflicts with the exigencies of social action. However, the unlimited potential and the accessibility of knowledge, which does not affect its meaning, makes it in peculiar and unusual ways, relatively resistant to private ownership (Stehr, 1994).

However, this does not preclude the knowledge producer, in this context the university, from taking market-driven decisions. In the university

setting, academic disciplines are manifested as particular ‘ways of knowing’ or ‘knowledge practices’ that are maintained both by socially reproducing new practitioners and also by defending or extending the boundaries of that discipline in relation to other academic groups (Becher, 1989; Gieryn, 1983). Much as a firm seeks to protect its market niche, academic disciplines seek to protect and extend their shares in the cognitive marketplace. This is seen in the use of geographical metaphors for knowledge such as a field, realm, domain, territory, or frontier that knowledge workers map, annex, or explore (Abbott, 1988; Bourdieu, 1984; Brown, 1998). Thus, as Thomas Gieryn has instructively indicated, the landscape for academic knowledge “has been carved up into separate institutional and professional niches through continuing processes of boundary work designed to achieve an apparent differentiation of goals, methods, capabilities and substantive expertise” (1983:783).

Thus, without rigorous analysis, many questions about the relationship between the corporate, government and university worlds remain unresolved. As Axelrod (1982) rightly indicated, universities are imperfect instruments of economic development and as such, the march to the neoliberal marketplace by most universities must be seen as a matter of cultural leadership rather than an overt attempt on the part of corporations to control research and teaching. In a related publication, Axelrod (2002) acknowledged that the problem facing universities in embracing the paradoxical neoliberal marketplace is that the stated goals of liberal education are so all-encompassing. The impact of globalization and the architecture of global capitalism have heightened the problem to the extent that universities are simultaneously declaring their undying commitment to the ideals of liberal education, but yet, are marrying more and more of their academic life to the assumed needs of the marketplace (Axelrod, 2002). Indeed, as my senior colleague Professor Steve Tonah recently reminded me in one of our numerous discourses, both forms exist in every university. Law, accounting, marketing, etc. provide market targeted professional training while the social sciences and Arts provide general education. This resonates with the core argument of

Jencks and Riesman (1969) to the effect that fresh students of university age worried about their future careers in the past just as they do today, and this affected both the kind of people who came to university and the kind of things they did upon arrival (Jencks and Riesman, 1969:199).

Interestingly, the German critical theorist, Jurgen Habermas (1971), in his attempt to address the old German question of the idea of the university, attacked those who try to reduce the university to either a site of the production of instrumental knowledge or to that of cultural humanism. Habermas' argument was that the university was not defined by either organized or liberal modernity but rather by the task of providing a political education through the shaping of a political consciousness among its students. As he put it:

For too long, the consciousness that took place in German universities was apolitical. It was a singular mixture of inwardness, deriving from the culture of humanism, and of loyalty to state authority...This process reproduced the mentality of a university-trained professional stratum for which society still intended a relatively uniform status...As we know, the academic stratum, shaped by a uniform mentality, has dissolved in connection with long-term structural changes in society (Habermas, 1971:3).

While the concerns expressed here fit into Habermas' overall scheme of breathing life into his project of modernity via communicative action, he was nonetheless moved by the growing radicalism and unrest of the late 1960s. In a move similar to the simmering debates about liberal education versus vocationalism (see Jencks and Riesman, 1969), he dreaded the implications of having the university "absorbed into the role of merely producing and transmitting technical knowledge and providing society with technical skilled labour force" (Delanty, 2001:65). For him, the role of the university is the interpretation of society's self-understanding rather than being reduced to a mere vehicle through which cultural heritage is transmitted in an unmediated manner (Habermas,

1971). Habermas believed that “it belongs to the task of the university to transmit, interpret, and develop the cultural tradition of the society” (1971:2). He, thus, calls for a critical reflection by the university on its own pre-suppositions and the necessity to embark on radical internal democratization (Habermas, 1971). This clarion call is ironically missing within the largely post-militaristic African university spaces.

The German problem that Habermas sought to unpack is very peculiar to our context: the “university was inserted into democratic society with a certain political extension of its traditional understanding, but otherwise just as it was” (1971: 5). But the university is a ‘bundle institution’ involved in such activities as: research process, general education, cultural self-understanding, the formation of public opinion, and the training of future specialists (Habermas, 1992:107). As Habermas noted, as long as this complex has not been completely torn apart “the idea of the university cannot be completely dead” because “a new life can be breathed into the idea of the university” from “outside its walls” (Habermas, 1992:108). While the exact meaning of this statement may be subjected to interpretation, it leaves open the possibility that the texture and trajectory of globalization and knowledge production are communicative.

### **Universities and the Neoliberal Marketplace: Reality or Naïve Capitalism**

In one of the early pioneering research on academic capitalism, Blumenthal and his collaborators undertook a survey of 1200 biotechnology faculty in 40 of the most research-intensive universities in the United States of America to ascertain the empirical basis of many of the fears and concerns of university-industry research relations. The study found that 30 percent of biotechnology faculty who received funding from industry acknowledged to some or to a greater extent the influence of commercial considerations on their project choices. Only seven percent of those who did not receive industrial support said commercial factors influenced project choices (Blumenthal et al. 1986:1364).

The study also explores the concern that academics that received industrial support are perhaps less interested in and are not dedicated to traditional university activities. Here, the argument is twofold. First, the fear is that entrepreneurial faculty will become interested in knowledge capitalization and thus pursuing more applied research that is of less cerebral value. Second, there is a concern that their involvement with industry will persuade them to partake in time-consuming tasks that will compete with university activities vital to the health of the universities and the scientific discipline (Blumenthal et al. 1986). However, the results indicated that compared with colleagues engaged in biotechnology research, faculty receiving industry support reported significantly more publications and involvement with other professional activities but no statistically significant difference in teaching time (Blumenthal et al. 1986:1362).

Another aspect of university-industry research relations that their study probed was the argument that university-industry research arrangements may create incentives for faculty to keep their research secret and that industry is more likely to impede publication of research findings. Indeed, some aspects of their findings lend support to these concerns. The authors found that biotechnology faculty with industry support were four times as likely as other biotechnology faculty (12 versus 3%,  $P < 0.001$ ) to report that trade secrets had resulted from their university research<sup>2</sup>. Among biotechnology faculty involved in university-industry research collaborations, 24 percent reported that they had withheld information based on industrial sponsored research and only five percent among faculty without industry support responded as having done the same (Blumenthal et al., 1986).

In another work by Kleinman and Vallas (2001), the authors found that even in the absence of commercial considerations, information, data and research materials do not always flow unreservedly. Inter-lab

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<sup>2</sup> In the study, trade secret was defined as information kept secret to protect its proprietary value (Blumenthal et al. 1986).

competition often makes researchers averse to supplying research materials to their colleagues. Also, failure by scientists to “maintain adequate biological materials in their laboratories makes it impossible for the scientists to supply the materials to other researchers upon request” (Kleinman and Vallas, 2001:456). In this survey of life scientists, 24 percent of respondents said that financial interests in or agreements with a company affected their decision to withhold information. But almost twice that many respondents said that they withheld data or materials from colleagues to protect their scientific lead, and another 27 percent said costs affected their decision to restrict the flow of data or materials from their lab (Kleinman and Vallas, 2001: 459-460). Based on these considerations, Shapin (1988) suggested that it is appropriate to consider scientists as investing their particular scientific capital in different ways to defend and prosecute their interests with or against others.

Also, Daniel Kleinman based on an ethnographic study of the Handelsman Biology Laboratory at the University of Wisconsin-Madison argues that we can productively think about commercial influences on academic science, and the practice of university science through the analysis of structure rather than a narrow focus on agency. His assertion is that by overly focusing on possible threats to the university from direct and explicit relationships in university-industry relations, we glossed over the less overt, but far more pervasive effects of commercial factors on the practice of academic science. To underscore the pervasiveness of the indirect influence of commerce on the academia, he cited an interesting but intriguing case that was reported in the 1997 fall edition of the journal *Science* concerning the effect of a ‘materials transfer agreement’—MTA (Kleinman, 2003:125-6).

According to the report, two University of California scientists asked a colleague at Oxford University in England to provide them with some mammalian DNA sequence that the Oxford colleague had developed. The California scientists wanted the material for an experiment involving *transgenic* mice. Before Oxford would send out the genetic material,

they asked the University of California researchers and their non-profit sponsors to sign an agreement in which the scientists would surrender any intellectual property rights for inventions developed with the genetic material (Kleinman, 2003:125-6). In addition, Oxford requested the right to preview and comment on articles arising from the scientists' research. According to the scientists interviewed for the article, these kinds of requirements are increasingly common in certain areas of the life sciences (Kleinman, 2003:125-6).

For Kleinman, we cannot understand the dynamics and character of contemporary academic science without understanding the social environment in which the university as an institution and university science as a product is embedded. It is clear that within the globalised knowledge-driven context, "commerce, in the broadest possible sense, is a significant element of this social environment, and will consequently play a part in shaping the practices of university science" (Kleinman, 2003:138-9). Thus, both direct and indirect influences must be taken into account when analyzing the issue of universities and globalization.

It is undeniable that modern universities have always had a flirtatious relationship with the marketplace under the pretext of remaining practical or relevant to their constituencies. In recent times, however, these liaisons have taken on a more forceful character, blurring boundaries and the frequency with which knowledge production and market forces interact. The social function of the university, which is often disguised, may appear to be transformed, but it largely remains as the production and consolidation of the elite (Turner, 1998). As the juggernaut of globalization finds expression in the massification of education and its attendant regurgitation of industrial and cultural production, the traditional role and the social function of the university is now under scrutiny (Delanty, 1997 and 2001). This globalization of knowledge, and to a larger extent of culture, finds credence in the argument that the postmodern constellations of knowledge have resulted in the separation of the nation-state from high culture. Accordingly, Zygmunt Bauman concluded that whilst in modernity intellectuals were



the legislators of culture within the national university system, they have merely become culture interpreters in the neoliberal marketplace (Bauman, 1997 cited in Turner 1998:75). But how does these transformations impact universities in Africa?

### **African Universities and the Edges of Neoliberalism**

In the early 1980s, most African countries reeling under massive external debt turned to the Bretton Woods institutions for help. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) that followed affected most universities whose budgets were entirely dependent on national governments. This period of retrenchment and decline in funding was followed by an unexpected renewal phase initiated by a half dozen African universities. University reforms included the admission of private fee-paying students, permission for faculty members to retain a share of incomes generated from private consulting income, and the introduction of distance education programmes and private universities (InterAcademy Council, 2005; Manuh, Sulley and Budu, 2007).

But these restructurings did not just happen but were part and parcel of larger economic, political and social reforms. For example, the innovation programme at Makerere University in Uganda reorganized its academic programs to contribute directly and immediately to national development within the framework of the government's decentralization process. Its aim was to train cohorts of public servants in health, agriculture and administration, to staff district offices. This was achieved through major changes in curriculum and 'sandwich' programs whereby students undertake fieldwork in the districts throughout their academic training (InterAcademy Council, 2005).

In response to these internal transformations, many donors rediscovered universities. The World Bank which for decades focused its policies and strategies around basic education bought in and redirected some attention to higher education. It must be stated, however, that even with this new vision, which sought to explicate the role of African universities in socio-economic development, the echoes of the inherent underlying

neoliberal market permutations could be heard far and near and from the beams of power both within and outside the universities. This new faith in universities as instruments of neoliberal capitalism culminated in the refocusing of higher education policies and strategies on the so-called concept of the 'knowledge society' (World Bank, 2002). In this regard, the World Bank financed the establishment of the African Virtual University (AVU) in 1997 to provide quality higher education in science and engineering.

The Institute for Food Laws and Regulations at Michigan State University responded by creating six distance education courses on food laws and regulations. Through these information and communication technology initiatives and applications, some African students were able to interact with a globalized audience in their fields while remaining in their home settings. Cornell University also provides lectures on cutting-edge topics in breeding and biotechnology to students participating in a regional PhD programme offered by the University of Natal, with support from The Rockefeller Foundation (InterAcademy Council, 2005).

In addition, a new USAID global initiative was also introduced to increase the number of scholarships for postgraduate study in the United States and capacity-building grants to retrain university lecturers, especially those in agriculture. Four U.S. foundations have played a critical role in supporting the renewal phase of African higher education. In 2000, the Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie and MacArthur Foundations launched The Partnership for Higher Education in Africa. With a 10-year time frame, the foundations spent about US\$100 million over the first five years to support universities pursuing reforms in Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. During the first two years (2000-2001), the four foundations together contributed US\$62 million to higher education in the above six African countries (InterAcademy Council, 2005).

The above iterations in and of themselves do not constitute a radical break or complicity in the market oriented machinations of the neoliberal policy regime. As David (1994) indicated in his path-dependency analysis, the incrementally-laden evolution of institutions in terms of structure and function is conditioned by inherent practices. In Ghana, and in most of Africa, there is the massification of tertiary education through the establishment of private universities that were affiliated to the public universities already in existence. The admission requirements until recently were not stringent, so demand was high and the focus was narrow: business, law and other so-called market-driven courses were the norm. In addition, there have been the proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the flooding of the civil society space by research agencies, led by academics, particularly those in the social sciences, who were combining the dual roles or moving entirely to the civil society sector where donor dollars were attractive top-up to their public sector measly pay packages. As Nwagwu put it, in the context of Nigeria,

The proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs)...which are led mainly by serving researchers in the university and which also employ on full time basis the services of trained researchers, epitomises a development in which money obtained from abroad for research purposes is privately invested. These NGOs are themselves both clients of the funding agencies and home government who invariably determine the kind of research they fund as well as the use to which the research products are put. This development was fuelled, not by a natural drift of research consciousness to the non-university sector, but by what could be regarded as a face-off between the international community and sit-tight military interregna that ruled the country over high levels of home grown and internationally sponsored official corruption and gross mismanagement of resources (2008:689).

There is in motion a process of making universities in Africa relevant to socio-economic development. Some observers point to the proliferation of foreign-funded research and advocacy agencies in Africa and in the context of Ghana, think tanks and civil society groups such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), the Institute of Democracy and Economic Governance (IDEG), and the Centre for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA), just to mention a few, which are led and operated by academics who at a time were within the mainstream universities. These non-state actors are now the main agenda-setting organizations in Ghana, but to keen observers, these institutions should not be seen as being outside the ambit of the neoliberal paradox. One just needs to look at how the World Bank refashioned the unpopular structural adjustment programmes as partnerships that require states to write their own Poverty Reduction Strategy papers (PRSPs) to see not only the reach but the tentacles of the Bretton Woods system. It is within this general context that the IMF and the World Bank turned around to also insist on the involvement of civil society and business rather than just governments (McMichael, 2012:152). To paint the issue in broad strokes, while the kinds of knowledge capitalization tend to be based on the so-called 'science-business' alluded to earlier, the market permutations are in different ways permeating the social science departments as consultancy projects. So we need to understand the pervasive influence of the neoliberal paradox within a much broader context, that within the confines of African universities, consultancy projects take prominence over a fully functioning market-based system. However, no matter how we analyse the situation, academic capitalism provides a context through which we must guard against an unbridled push by the connoisseurs of neoliberal capitalism.

### **Conclusion: Universities and the Market—an uneasy alliance?**

That universities and the neoliberal marketplace are products of interaction and negotiation is without doubt. This interplay makes knowledge the corollary through which the symbiotic relationship

between globalization and universities is explored, albeit with cautious pessimism. The argument is that universities by their nature and configurations are instruments of society and their key product, knowledge, is even more an outcome of the internal logic of science, as broadly conceived. The persistence of the social environment within which such knowledge is incubated cannot itself be delinked from the cultural base. Simply stated, academic knowledge is without doubt an outcome of an inherent social, economic and political need. But as new considerations and fields of knowledge emerge, valid claims of today may become false claims of yesterday. This understanding enables us to link the process of globalization, following the footsteps of Thomas Gieryn (1983), to a map which actually only represents certain aspects of natural realities that in and of itself may be as exploitative as knowledge and the university.

Consequently, while the interplay between globalization and university goes beyond the dictates of neoliberal capitalist ideology, the overarching arms of the market cannot be wished away but must be managed in such a way that inequality is minimized while knowledge is harnessed for socio-economic renewal. The transformation of aspects of the university in almost all knowledge regimes, be it *laisse faire*, statist or corporatist, has largely become visible beyond academic spaces. The contributions of universities to the globalization of technoscience connect with the pervasive issues of science, technology and democracy in helping universities to leave visible imprints on the globalization process.

The neoliberal push to the market may be appealing, but the question still remains as to whether it is the panacea to universities in all jurisdictions. African universities in particular face a dilemma which the neoliberal paradox cannot fully unpack. There are innovative research activities such as the promising collaborative research involving a chemistry researcher from the University of Ghana and his collaborators from the University of Aberdeen and Wuhan University that led to the discovery of a set of new alkaloids from a novel Ghanaian

microorganism. While the press release was muted on intellectual property considerations, it will not come as a surprise to critical observers of technoscience. The pulls of the marketplace are happening in other domains that are not tied to academic research but are likely to be extended to that sphere soon. As we navigate the lures of the neoliberal market we must confront the reality of the question that David F. Noble (2002: ix) has asked in another context, but which finds fitting expression here: “Did the historical understanding and experience of the trials of others give us any advantage in our own?”

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## **GHANA'S FOREIGN POLICY CHOICES IN RELATION TO WIELDING OIL AND GAS RESOURCE FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION**

**Kennedy Emmanuel Ahorsu<sup>1</sup>**

### **Abstract**

Studies on Ghana's fledgling oil economy have preponderantly focused on how to avoid the resource 'curse.' They are overly endogenous in outlook and substance. This paper acknowledges the fortitude of the internal concerns and prescriptions, but argues that addressing regional challenges and corollaries are equally critical to the viability of Ghana's oil industry. The study makes the case that the rate of discovery of oil in West Africa and its exigencies such as the demarcating of exclusive maritime economic zones; transnational security threats; and ECOWAS protocols on free movement of persons, establishment, the environment, and human rights have conjoined the fate of the oil-producing states. It proposes a collective regional—policy-oriented—natural resource management approach through progressive foreign policy choices to prevent the identified challenges and threats from across the sub-region from bedevilling the oil sector.

**Keywords:** Ghana's Oil Industry, Natural Resources, Regional Integration, Security-Development, and Foreign Policy

### **Introduction**

The discovery of oil in 2007 in commercial quantities by Cosmos Energy off the coast of western Ghana has brought high expectations and caused unease among Ghanaians. Since the Arab Petroleum Exporting

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Countries' oil embargo triggered the 1970s Oil Shocks and created the global energy crisis, oil, apart from its intrinsic economic value, has gained national prestige and geo-strategic significance. The deleterious effects of the energy crisis wiped off the foreign reserves of non-oil producing African states and induced a sharp economic decline that precipitated the unwieldy 1980s debt crisis.<sup>2</sup> Although the volume of Ghana's proven oil reserves is not large enough to qualify it to join the influential Organisation of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC), further discoveries have since been made and the expectations are that more discoveries will be made in the near future (Worldnews.Com, 2012). The hope is that the discovery will ease Ghana's oil import bill, favourably balance its GDP, attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), ameliorate the performance of the economy and improve the living standards of Ghanaians. Others informed by the economic theory of conflict and the natural resource curse discourse are however apprehensive (Kumah-Abiwu, *et al.*, 2015).

The main challenge then is how best to insulate the fledgling oil industry from the ills that have afflicted countries such as Nigeria. This article recognises the relevance of the cautionary 'internal' measures of prudent policy fortitude and candour. It, however, argues that Ghana's oil find is only one in West Africa's contemporary oil rush and swing. Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have also announced the discovery of oil in commercial quantities. The rate of discovery of oil and the fact that all littoral oil producing states in the sub-region share the same continental-shelf seriously harbingers probable goal incompatibilities in their quest to extend their continental-shelf deeper into the international waters for further oil exploration. The likely extension foreshadows serious implications for demarcating national territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (Obeng-Odoom, 2012: 20). Oil prospecting in the sub-region thus poses challenges far beyond the remit of any one oil-prospecting-state. Given the leverage of oil companies and transnational

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<sup>2</sup> The rising cost of oil in the mid-2000s also wiped out the gains many Africa countries were anticipating from western aid and debt relief (Financial Times, 2007).



security threats, the interests of the oil producing states will be best served if they work together. Moreover, ECOWAS integration policies bordering on the free movement of people, establishment, human rights, the environment, and good governance have ramifications for Ghana's oil industry. The article argues that regional challenges and corollaries are as critical as the national concerns for Ghana's oil industry's viability and are best addressed through progressive foreign policy choices since the interests of Ghana and the sub-region are conjoined.

The article is organised into six sections: introduction, extant literature, regional integration framework, transnational security threats, Ghana's foreign policy choices, and conclusion. This study is largely influenced by the presentations, deliberations, and conclusions of the November 8-10, 2010 Workshop on "Foreign Policy in Ghana's Emerging Oil Economy" organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration (MFA). Extra data for the study was gathered from both primary and secondary sources.

### **Extant Literature and the Case for Greater Regional Approach through Foreign Policy Choices**

Nature's endowments, be they human, land, sea, climatic conditions, and other natural resources have been primary factors that have aided and defined the identity and destiny of many states. (Todaro and Smith, 2009: 21). Given its rich natural resources, Africa was expected to attain an appreciable degree of development by prioritizing "functional necessities of welfare creation in the most crucial areas of poverty reduction (Gebe, 2006: 126). However, Africa's natural resources have been associated with the metaphorical natural resource "curse" or "paradox of plenty" (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Asafu-Adjaye, 2009). Civil strife in Africa and the utility of natural resources ("greed and grievance") have spawned the security-development amalgam (Ahorsu; 2007). The endowment of natural resources increases the risk and duration of war as they serve as attractions for rebels (Collier and Toffler, 1998, 2001, 2004; Grossman, 1999). This often creates 'war

economies;’ whereby, warlords and rogue businessmen exploit the economic opportunities presented by lawlessness (Keen, 1998; Berdal and Malone, 2000).

The natural resource paradigms and the inverse implications for development have been severally criticised for being overly endogenous, uncritical, ahistorical, reductionist, and logically flawed, especially, in downplaying the intersubjective meanings of violence (Ahorsu, 2007; Ayelazuno, 2013; Stewart and Lange, 2008; Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio 2007). For “neither scarcity nor abundance of resources ...the real cause of conflict; rather, it is the management of these resources.” (Alao, 2007: 2).

This trend in scholarship is due to the way curses and blessings intermingle and impact diversely on different social groups in countries where natural resources are found (Obeng-Odoom, 2012). The studies are optimistic that given Ghana’s pedigree of relative stability, strong institutions, democratic dispensation, mature-local government, positive record of mining, and vibrant civil society its oil find will be a blessing (Ayelazuno, 2013; Gyima-Boadi 2009; Crawford, 2010). The literature identifies probable fault-lines of conflict such as youth marginalisation and unemployment, loss of livelihoods, worsening fisherfolks’ incomes, unmet communal expectation, communal rivalries, environmental degradation, and the paradox of common poverty amidst oil-induced high cost of living (Amoasah 2010; Boohene and Peprah 2011; Yalley and Ofori-Darko, 2012; Darkwah, 2013; Cavnar, 2008; Adu, 2009; Obeng-Odoom, 2012). The Cote d’Ivoire-Ghana boundary conflict is the main oil-boundary challenge facing Ghana (Jonah 2008). In the absence of adequate laws and mechanisms for regulating boundary conflicts in West Africa (Oteng-Odoom 2012; Buama 2012), public opinion pressure has awakened government to seek an amicable solution to the Ghana-Cote d’Ivoire crisis (Koomson 2010).

## **Theoretical Basis of Regional Integration**

The historical antecedents of regional integration can be traced to the search for alternatives to prevent another World War after the termination of the Second World War and the search for alternatives efforts by integration theorists in Europe to link regional integration to peace and development. The cumulative effect of political and technocratic cooperation is what undergirds the institutional and operational framework of the 1993 revised Treaty of ECOWAS. By carving a role for both governments and technocrats, the revised ECOWAS Treaty reinforces postulations by both functionalism and neo-functionalism that political leadership and technocratic efforts are indispensable to resolving the challenges of economic development and peace and security. Crucially, ECOWAS is conscious of the fact that a successful integration in one functional necessity area, such as conflict prevention, would inevitably have a benign ramification or spill over effect on economic development. In the same vein, the inability of Ghana to optimally manage her oil resources would trigger an adverse spill over effect and stifle development in West Africa.

Crucial to the integrationist approach of (policy oriented) integrated natural resources governance is Mitrany's theory of ramification (the 'spill over' effect) that "success in one functional setting would enhance incentives for collaboration in other fields" (Mitrany, 1943). Cooperation in one area thus leads to cooperation in more areas as states become 'fixated' on the integration process. Through coordinated (foreign) policies, cooperation and orderliness in the governance of transnational natural resources such as sea-based oil exploration will be created and accepted by West African states as they come to appreciate their conjoined social, cultural, environmental, economic and political resource interests. The above elucidation indicates why in crafting foreign policies, regional variables must be accounted for, notwithstanding the pursuit of core national interests (Boafo-Arthur, 1989; Quarm, 1995).

## **Ghana's Foreign Policy Trajectory and Regional Integration**

The ground rules of Ghana's foreign policy are outlined in Articles 40, 41, 73 and 81, and the Guiding Principles of State Policy outlined in the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution of Ghana. In broad terms, however, Ghana's foreign policy is undergirded by five cardinal themes. These include the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty, the promotion of good neighbourliness and continental unity through economic and political integration, and a non-aligned actor in the pursuit of global peace and security. Ghana's first President, Kwame Nkrumah, relentlessly used these themes in the pursuit of continental unity under the aegis of Pan-Africanism (Nkrumah, 1963: 176).

Thus, from 1957 to February 1966, the principles of good neighbourliness and regional integration found expression almost exclusively within the framework of radical Pan-Africanism that advocated immediate continental unification. In this context, the Union of African States, otherwise known as the Ghana—Guinea—Mali Union (1960-1963), and also the Casablanca Group (1961-1963), were seen as the building blocks of a continental government (Landberg, 2004).

Mention has to be made that Ghana's foreign policy spanning 1966-1972 was hamstrung by a number of domestic policies with invidious implications for regional integration, such as the Aliens Compliance Order in 1969 that sent citizens of neighbouring states, particularly Nigeria, packing, which undermined Ghana's mantra of good neighbourliness at the inception of independence. Similarly, Nigeria reciprocated the aforesaid as Ghanaians were expelled from that country between 1983 and 1985. Subsequently, however, there has been an improvement in relations between the two countries leading to a thickening web of cooperation for a greater regional integration. Overall, between 1972 and 1990, though the concept of Pan-Africanism gained much traction in official and public discourse, Ghana's neighbourhood and regional integration policy was generally characterised by obfuscation, a certain degree of pragmatism (Boafo-

Arthur, 1989) and varying dimensions of ‘external co-optation’ (Libby, 1976: 67-89) driven by the exigencies of socio-economic development.

What has remained an integral component of Ghana’s foreign policy, though, is her enthusiasm for regional economic integration. Actually, Ghana’s commitment to regional integration was unwavering, and it is worthy to note that Ghana hosted a United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)-sponsored Conference in 1967, that led to the signing of Articles of Association for the establishment of a West African Economic Community (Asante, 1986).

The new realities thrown up by the end of the Cold War forced a rethink of the obvious contradictions between domestic priorities and regional imperatives. The economic stagnation in the early 1990s, and its rippling effects on domestic pressures for political and democratic reform (Callagy, 2004), as well as the raging civil wars and their proliferation, convinced the leadership of the region of the need to swim together or sink into oblivion. Ghana was the largest contributor of troops and financial resources behind Nigeria and played a pivotal role in managing and resolving civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea Bissau. This period saw the ground-breaking metamorphosis of the ECOWAS institutional framework, including the transformation of its Secretariat into a Commission in 2017. This was done to ensure the ECOWAS remains ‘a vital cog’ in the matrix of regional integration (Asante, 2004: 53). The regional implications of Ghana’s oil discovery and the fact that all West African states are susceptible to similar security threats (Soderbaum and Hettne 2010) call for Ghana’s domestic policies to be a double-edged sword: ameliorating mutual vulnerabilities emanating from within the sub-region while simultaneously applying oil and gas resources as leverage to promote regional integration.

## **Regional Threats: Mutual Vulnerabilities**

### ***Maritime Boundary Disputes***

Before the discovery of oil and gas in Ghana, it was inconceivable to anticipate the possibility of maritime disputes between Ghana and neighbouring states, particularly Côte d'Ivoire. The key challenge that confronted Ghana was incessant complaints by fishermen about sophisticated trawlers harvesting fish within Ghana's maritime domains (African Defense Forum (ADF), 2013). With the discovery of oil came additional challenges. The maritime dispute between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire emerged in 2011, when the latter appealed to the UN to delineate her maritime borders with Ghana. With the real prospects of striking oil in the Keta Basin, the possibility of similar disputes with eastern neighbours cannot be dismissed. Thus, in her application to extend her continental shelf Ghana will face possible challenges and contestations from Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin and Nigeria, as these states equally desire to do the same. Although the UN, AU, and ECOWAS institutions could mediate such challenges, the problem is that there is no consensus on the methodologies for delimiting continental shelves. Issues pertaining to the discovery of oil appeal to national interest and security concerns. However, there are circumstantial, legal and institutional constraints in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that limit the unrestrained pursuit of national interest. Given the arduous process and the zero-sum outcome of the Nigeria-Cameroon Bakassi adjudication in favour of Cameroon, sub-regional diplomacy offers Ghana the best options in view of the limitations inherent in the adjudication of maritime border disputes (Buama, 2012). Evolving a sub-regional regime to manage the exigencies of oil prospecting will not only further promote regional integration but inspire investors' confidence in the sub-region.

### ***Deficient Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)***

Multinational corporations remain dominant players in West Africa's oil and gas sectors. Kosmos Energy, Tullow Oil, Anadarko, Oronto Petroleum, Repsol, Vanco, Lukoil and China Petroleum, among others,

have stakes in Ghana's nascent oil and gas sectors. While this is a positive development from the point of view of Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), there is a potential for these multinational oil corporations to shirk their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The paucity of CSR is evident in the lack of interest on the part of oil companies in ameliorating environmental and bio-diversity perils as a result of oil exploration. The lack of an effective CSR has festered in Nigeria, where multinational oil companies have an inclination for super-normal profits while repatriating huge profits for investments elsewhere (Eweje, 2006: 29). The primary responsibility for providing functional necessities of socio-economic development must be the prerogative of government. However, oil companies, considering their vast financial wherewithal, also have a secondary responsibility to operationalise their CSR to complement governments' efforts. This becomes imperative particularly in instances where the environment is devastated as a result of the operations of oil companies. Ghana's preparedness to govern its oil industry has been criticized as being inadequate (Adu 2009; Van Gyampo 2011), many critical measures for safeguarding the environment have remained undeveloped (Adu, 2009; Obeng-Odoom, 2012), and the laws governing oil exploration (Petroleum Exploration and Production, PNDC Law 84; the Petroleum Income Tax Law of 1987, PNDC Law 1980) are out-of-date and muddled since they were passed years before oil was found in commercial quantities (Gary, 2009; Cavnar, 2008).

Studies have revealed that the regulatory institutions are weak, and local communities and civil society organisations have neither been consulted nor integrated into the regulatory regimes (Cavnar, 2008; Gadugah, 2010; Van Gyampo, 2011; King, 2009; World Bank, 2009). The concerns are that the largely illiterate and technically unconscious local communities that spawn the oil producing locales, coupled with the weak institutional and legal frameworks, and poor mobilization and inclusion of civil society organisation into the oversight institutions that characterize the oil governance regimes, potentially serve as recipes for rent seeking, corruption and corporate social irresponsibility. It is plausible that outrageous profit seeking oil companies may imprudently

use their vast wealth to influence state officials tasked to ensure compliance while corrupting their way through the high echelons of power. A case in point is the refusal of Kosmos to pay a penalty of \$35 million imposed by a ministerial committee for severely damaging the environment by spilling 706 barrels of toxic materials into the sea. Kosmos is reported to have queried the legal basis of the ministerial committee, viewing it as “totally unlawful, unconstitutional, *ultra vires* and without basis” (Xinxua, 2010; Oteng-Odoom, 2012). My position is that learning from West African experiences would help Ghana avoid the mistakes made in the Niger Delta. It is plausible that the combined powers and weight of ECOWAS regulatory mechanisms would be more effective than those of any one oil-producing country in the sub-region.

### ***Transnational Organized Crime***

The West Africa sub-region is inundated with transnational organized crime ranging from narcotics trade to money laundering (Duquet, 2009: 174). The Gulf of Guinea Basin and the Sahel-Sahara Corridor to the north have been transformed into veritable havens for transnational organized crime gangs (Lyman, 2009: 227). This is because poverty, porosity of borders and the dearth of maritime security have culminated in the illicit narcotics trade, cyber-crime, piracy, oil bunkering, kidnapping, human and arms trafficking, among others (Klare, 1999). The massive use of communication technologies such as the computer and mobile phones has made the guarantee of apt security an imperative. The West African sub-region has gained worldwide infamy in the utility of the internet for cybercrime and fraud. The virtual world that the internet affords makes it very difficult to trace and arrest the fraudsters. The correlation between cybercrime, security and development is demonstrably palpable as no serious minded entrepreneur would like to invest in a region where racketeering is pervasive.

Hitherto, the main source of insecurity was largely land-based internally generated threats in West Africa. Current trends indicate that sea-based transnational security threats have gained political significance. Drug-trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, illegal migration and human



trafficking, pollution and environmental security, smuggling by sea, illegal fishing, small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation are all sea-based trans-border security threats. A thriving oil and gas industry in Ghana run by companies mainly from the West is an incentive for transnational armed gangs and militias, pirates and even terrorists to accentuate their activities across West Africa. Ghana's naval resources pale into insignificance in light of emerging threats including piracy. Admittedly, Ghana's Navy has been equipped with speed boats, while a special unit, envisaged to be 'trained in ship hijack, hostage rescue and landing operations to protect ships from pirate attacks in Ghana's territorial waters has been incepted' (Daily Graphic, 2013). However, commenting on the strength of the Navy, Ghana's Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Rear Admiral Geoffrey Biekro admits that 'conventional forces and equipment were not suitable to counter threats by pirates, for which reason there was the need for formidable Special Forces to deal with those threats' (Daily Graphic, 2013).

The poor state of Ghana's naval capabilities mirrors the limited capacities of the naval forces of other West African states. They lack trained adequate personnel and logistics (African Defense Forum (ADF, 2013: 15). Access to Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) and the teeming number of unemployed and frustrated youth ease the mobilization and galvanization of efforts for violent conflicts (Ahorsu, 2009: 58-59). The diffuse, unpredictable, and mobile nature of transnational security threats calls for deeper collaboration among West African states in the domains of joint-training, intelligence sharing, research and policy coordination.

### ***Morbid Symptoms of Migration***

(West) African states' borders are proverbially porous and fluid, often dividing ethnic groups, traditional communities, towns and even family households into different states. Such divided ethnic groups and traditional communities live and honour their socio-cultural bonds and practices irrespective of the exigencies, limitations and differentiations that modern statehood imposes. This reality makes the policing of

borders very difficult and uniquely qualifies migration within the sub-region. Yet, migration, especially the utility of migration and migrants, despite the circumstances, remains double-edged. This is especially so given the rising unemployment and migration related transnational security threats to the sub-region. Ghana's fledgling oil industry, conceivably, serves as a pull-factor for skilled and unskilled migrants and criminals, mainly from the sub-region. Skilled migrants will complement Ghana's oil industry's human resource needs while the unskilled ones and criminals will potentially create social problems.

The high expectations of Ghanaians, especially the residents of the Western Region, of employment prospects from the oil industry potentially pose serious security and xenophobic challenges; if and when they begin to perceive that their grand expectations are not being met. Often, immigrants become the scape-goats for failures in a migration-induced competitive job market. Migrants may equally take to crime to eke out a living if their pursuit of jobs in Ghana becomes a mirage. In the post 9/11 world, migration is often conceptualised as aiding transnational security threats. UNDP reports that the Western Region is witnessing hitherto uncommon crimes such as drugs and human trafficking, homicide, cybercrime and internet fraud (UNDP 2013). Immigration does not always pose transnational security threats; however, the threats posed by refugees from the sub-region's conflicts such and the ills of militants from the Niger Delta palpably forewarn Ghana to proactively regulate migration effectively.

Ghana is, however, obliged by an array of international conventions and treaties to sustain particular standards of behaviour related to migration statutes. These principles need to be maintained and broadened and not curtailed, though with greater caution and surveillance. The discovery of oil, a migration pull-factor, will plausibly test Ghana's resolve and commitment to permitting the free flow of factors of production, a key component of ECOWAS' Common Market objectives. Ghana would have no option than to allow for the unhindered flow of factors of production including labour. The challenges of migration and its

attendant transnational security threats call for greater collaboration among West African states to create a credible data on all aspects of people including social and moral data. This needs the adoption of hi-tech modes of surveillance, DNA profiling, and conflict-sensitive policies across the sub-region.

### ***Environmental Degradation and Marine Pollution***

In the chronicles of oil exploration, oil spillage and its concomitant environmental disasters constitute the major setback. The probability of oil spillage needs to be factored into the security insurance of Ghana's oil industry. Unfortunately, as stated above, preparations for environmental governance of the oil industry is one of the major sectors that have been faulted by critics for being largely exclusive, outdated, and without enforcement authority. The 2010 BP Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the cliché of Niger Delta's environmental calamity are monstrous testimonies of oil exploration. Oil spillage and the dumping of other toxic substances often adversely affect water systems, the ecosystem, biodiversity, aquatic life, tourism and livelihoods. A major oil spillage from Ghana's oil industry will have dire repercussions for littoral West African states and beyond. There is, therefore, the need to incorporate all stakeholders' needs, fears, and concerns in the environmental governance designs. There are international environmental protection regimes such as the Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central Region (WACAF), also known as the Abidjan Convention around which Ghana can weave its environmental diplomacy. Ghana can play the lead role in invigorating interest in these regimes and help to organise joint training programmes with stakeholders across the sub-region. Environmental security is critical to eco-tourism and economic diplomacy, the new horizons Ghana's foreign policy seeks to attain.

### **'Regionalized' Foreign Policy Choices**

It is apparent from the above discussions that Ghana's ability to sustain her oil and gas industry is not dependent on purely endogenous good

governance policies. In today's ever globalising world, internal security concerns are not excluded from regional and global threats. In the face of the opportunities and challenges that Ghana's oil industry is confronted with, the crunch questions are: To what extent can Ghana's foreign policy choices help secure its oil industry and renew her verve for regional integration with a view to ameliorating the mutual potentials and vulnerabilities of West African states? To what extent would these policy choices resonate with ECOWAS' quest for natural resource governance demonstrable in Chapter VI of the ECOWAS revised Treaty and Article 64 of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention framework? The following are outlined as measures to obviate the challenges and in the process, manage Ghana's oil resources effectively and accelerate regional economic integration in West Africa.

***Think Regionally, Act Locally***

There is no gainsaying that national interest and foreign concerns often coalesce as foreign policy. This truism is vividly captured in the saying that "foreign policy and domestic policy are two sides of the same coin...foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy" (Bluwey, 2002: 43). As Ghana evolves measures to prevent a dire state of affairs in its oil industry, domestic policy-making with an eye for addressing relevant regional corollaries is inevitable. While the Jubilee Field remains the biggest success story in recent explorations, there is no doubt that the majority of West African States will become oil producers in the medium to long term (Worldnews.com 2012). The positive spin-offs of the oil and gas industry, such as the West Africa Gas Pipeline project, and the negative consequences such as pollution and sea-based crimes are not confined to national borders. The sustainability of Ghana's policies in this direction can only make greater sense if contextualised within a regional framework. Fortunately, ECOWAS provides such an institutional framework: The 2008 Conflict Prevention Framework, "Natural Resource Governance," which advocates an optimal regional approach to natural resources exploitation (reiterated in Chapter VI of ECOWAS' revised Treaty). This provides a foundation for Ghana to accelerate the pace of regional integration with oil and gas as tools.

Taxation must spur revenue collection agencies to generate additional revenue for government, while strengthening institutional mechanisms which would discourage capital flight.

However, as Ghana evolves oil and gas inspired regional policies, it is critical that the Government of Ghana (GoG) offers preferential treatment to local industries to give practical meaning to local content participation. The GoG has an onerous responsibility to encourage local content participation, be it at the upstream or downstream levels of production. Fortunately, one of the cornerstones of Ghana's energy policy is the optimal utilization of local content through the use of local expertise, goods and services, and funds for indigenous businesses (Ministry of Energy, 2010). This is important because a vibrant local oil industry would propel economic growth and enable indigenous businesses to become integral components of the oil and gas sectors, a state of affairs which would enable the retention of profits and reinvestments into other critical sectors of Ghana's economy. Indigenous entrepreneurs must be encouraged to explore joint-partnership with multinational corporations, who have the logistical and financial muscle for the capital-intensive domain of oil exploration. This can be achieved through a more vigorous pursuit of economic diplomacy to create better opportunities for Ghanaian businesses through collaboration with global oil and its ancillary companies.

### ***Proselytizing the Virtues of Governance***

As Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh (2012, 95) put it, "poor political and economic management of the country's resources are among the reasons for this disappointing record" of prudent, efficient, and viable exploitation of natural resources. Good governance remains one of the dominant panaceas in states' discourse globally. It "gives content to the social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of state and citizenry interactions" (Rotberg, 2009: 113). Governments in West Africa should consciously undertake their obligations as expected under the tenets of good governance to provide collective goods and services in ways that "are more easily - and more usually - managed and organized

by the overarching state than by private enterprises” (Rotberg, 2009: 114). Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh admit that the democratic advantages that the 1992 Constitutional provisions such as the vibrant media, parliament, and civil society organisations have already been influential in shaping the legislative and regulatory framework for managing the new oil sector (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2012). They, however, warned that noxious, rancorous, zero-sum politics and the polarization of Ghana along political-divides threaten to undermine the country’s democratic achievements. The fear is that the revenue from the oil industry and the leverage it affords the ambitious elite may exacerbate these problems. Since “the heart of the resource curse is that the resource rents (corruption) make democracy malfunction” particularly in low income countries (Collier 2007: 3).

The most decisive means of articulating the proficiency of good governance will be for Ghana to guarantee and strengthen the freedom of the media, engage and assist local communities and civil society organisations’ sustained interest as watch-dogs of (natural resource) good governance. Accountability institutions and national infrastructures for peace such as the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), the Judiciary, the National Peace Council (NPC), and the Public Accounts Committee, among others, must have their independence and resourcing truly guaranteed to perform their duties efficiently without fear or favour. The media, interest groups and civil society organisations must put their house in order through peer review mechanisms based on the concept of best practices and shed their political biases. It is only when Ghana manages her oil and gas wealth within the framework of good governance that it can become an advocate for good governance by promoting transparency and accountability in the sub-region. From that standpoint, Ghana can make a compelling case for why and how good governance matters in the matrix of natural resource governance.

### ***The Salience of Research and Information Sharing***

As stated earlier, West Africa is confronted with a myriad of structural, transnational and social challenges. The endowment and exploitation of natural resources have been a blessing and a curse, respectively, to different countries, communities, and groups at different times. For West African states, research to uncover the reasons that undermine the optimal exploitation of natural resources is very critical. Again, research and astute intelligence gathering are interlinked and crucial in providing information on criminal gangs and their *modus operandi*. Information gathered from research impacts richly upon decision-making and facilitates designs for confronting transnational criminals. Oil exploration entails gargantuan investment and risks, despite the putative benefits, and cutting edge research helps minimize risks.

Chapter VI, specifically Article 31 of the ECOWAS Treaty recognizes the relevance of cross-border exchange of ideas, and obliges member states to coordinate their policies on research and information on their natural resource prospects (ECOWAS Treaty, 1993). Ghana needs to strengthen her knowledge base in this relatively new domain. Article 31 (a) of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty encourages member states to ‘seek better knowledge and undertake an assessment of their natural resources potential’ (ECOWAS Treaty, 1993). It must also incorporate risk assessment of the involvement of foreign oil companies in Ghana’s oil industry and its implications for the socio-economic profile of Ghana. Ghana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration must tap into Ghanaian oil and gas expertise in existing maritime and petroleum-related research centres in the Diaspora to enhance its critical knowledge base in such vital areas. Ghana should lead in building a robust sub-regional research network on West Africa’s transnational natural resources with the view to influencing a regional natural resource policy. For the research to be effective, it must be well-resourced, timely, and enlist the necessary political will for the implementation of research findings and recommendations.

### ***Promotion of Increased Cross-Border Intelligence Gathering and Sharing***

Closely related to the Salience of Research and Information Sharing is the imperative of evolving an effective coordination mechanism to allow for intelligence gathering and sharing among relevant sector ministries, departments, and agencies within ECOWAS. While these ideals, processes and practices are germane to oil-producing and non-oil producing, as well as to littoral and land-locked ECOWAS member states in the light of contemporary transnational security threats, in the short-term, these must be prioritized by oil producing countries in West Africa. Cross-border intelligence gathering is, therefore, critical to preempting threats posed by criminal groups. The security agencies such as the Armed Forces, the Police, and other security agencies, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Energy, must be well resourced and empowered to enhance and coordinate cross-border intelligence gathering through the use of modern surveillance mechanisms in collaboration with other member states of ECOWAS.

The early warning system of the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security provides an organizational and operational framework for intelligence gathering. This Mechanism, however, needs fine-tuning to meet the ever widening security threats and challenges since it was primarily designed for conflict prevention. Intelligence gathered would be useful for reinforcing border patrols at strategic locations within oil exporting countries, monitoring and identifying potential grievances which can escalate into flashpoints of resource-driven conflicts, protecting key oil installations across the sub-region, and preventing access to SALWs by militias and vigilante groups, among others. This calls for the broadening of the West African security public in information gathering and sharing to include such non-traditional security organisations as the financial institutions, academia, the hospitality industry, computer technocrats and intellectuals and communication and transport sectors across the sub-region (Ahorsu, 2011).



### ***The Promotion of Regional Infrastructure Development***

A key constraint that has buffeted regional integration in West Africa is the poor state of infrastructure in the sub-region. The rapid improvement in road, air and maritime transport infrastructure, and in the areas of energy and communication, is not only central to the regional integration agenda but also vital for securing the oil industry and the people. Joint efforts in this domain with Ghana leveraging her oil and gas resources will foster goodwill and strengthen cross-border cooperation. These efforts should, consequently, constitute a critical aspect of the Economic Diplomacy Agenda of Ghana. It is envisaged that the integration of transport infrastructure would vastly reduce the cost of transportation within ECOWAS and “foster efficient operations as well as fair and equitable distribution of products and services” (Asante, 2007: 70). The betterment of regional infrastructure, especially improvement in the road and maritime transport networks, has the added advantage of securing roads and sea activities, since increased traffic and activities by multiple users afford greater presence and visibility that often deters criminals from attacking solitary road and marine users.

### ***Broadening the Frontiers of Regional Trade***

The focus on market integration in West Africa inevitably makes trade an important component of regionalism in the region. Although trade liberalization is hiccupping considerably without the attainment of a Customs Union, Ghana can expand trade with ECOWAS states through investments in her oil and gas industries as well as the export of oil and gas-related commodities. And ‘this will enable Ghanaian products to compete freely in the regional market and promote exports’ (Asante, 2007: 69). Expanding trade opportunities with oil and gas as building blocks can spill over to other sectors and create economies of scale leading to lower prices of goods and services. These serve to engender development through trade within ECOWAS and ‘improve methods of pricing and marketing of raw materials through a concerted policy’ (ECOWAS Treaty, 1993). With an appreciable level of the intra-regional trade required to nudge the sub-region into the centre of global trade, West African states would become central players in international trade

relations and ultimately improve their terms of trade with the rest of the world. Ghana should take up the challenge and forcefully work towards achieving monetary and currency integration throughout the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) (Alagidede & Tweneboah: 2015). The establishment of a single currency in the sub-region will potentially strengthen its economic stability through increased trade among its members and create opportunities for greater external investment.

### ***The Private Sector as the Engine of Growth***

The private sector is typically referred to as the engine of growth; however, the prevalence of economic challenges, including high interest rates, low savings, and spiralling inflation have proved to be disincentives to private sector investments in West Africa. Ghana's burgeoning oil and gas industry can spur a private sector-led initiative for regional integration. The oil and gas industry in Ghana could be the focal point to encourage the establishment of strong instruments of collaboration among private sector captains in West Africa to spur agglomeration effects by the establishment of a critical mass of key industry players and the transfer of expertise and technology. This will promote a private sector-led growth with a domino effect on employment in West Africa.

### ***Supplementing the Energy Needs of West African States***

Cheap availability, reliability and cost-effective access to energy are essential for the reduction of poverty and the promotion of development and economic growth in West Africa. The cost of energy in West Africa is generally prohibitive and dependence on non-renewable sources of energy is overwhelming. Ghana's gas will possibly accelerate the pace for ECOWAS' power pool project and create an interface that would supply power from countries endowed with high generation capacities to those with low capacities. Ghana must lead the way by researching, investing, and initiating policy in the long term energy solutions that alternative and renewable energy sources such as biomass, wind and wave, and geothermal sources afford. A promising initiative around which Ghana can build her foreign policy is the West African Power

Pool: Planning and Prospects for Renewable Energy that studies different developments for accelerated renewable energy uptake, centred on a modelling means expounded by IRENA and verified with support from ECOWAS. Early outcomes from the System Planning Test Model for West Africa (SPLAT-W), involving mainland ECOWAS states, reveal that the volume of renewable technologies in the sub-region could swell from the present 22% of electricity production to as much as 52% in 2030 (IRNA, 2012). In the long run, poverty reduction and the attainment of sustainable development of the sub-region rest on renewable energy sources.

### ***Incepting a Regional Naval Force in West Africa***

The establishment of an integrated marine strategy in West Africa remains an illusion although the sub-region's sea is endowed with natural resources that are faced with formidable illicit challenges. The paucity of protection for maritime domains of West African states has had a corrosive effect on national development as governments' revenues plummet as a result of illicit maritime activities. It is estimated that Nigeria lost over \$1 billion in oil revenue in 2009 (ADF, 2013: 53). Upgrading and retooling the naval forces would be a very costly enterprise and would take time. It is, therefore, plausible that littoral ECOWAS states pool their naval forces together as a short-term and a long-term regional measure to safeguard the sea. There is, nevertheless, the need for considerable investments aimed at improving the naval capabilities of littoral states in West Africa. First, force-contributing states must standardise their equipment and logistics, and harmonise their ethics and rules of engagement towards a regional approach to securing maritime domains. A regional marine force, if incepted, must be equipped with well trained personnel, gadgets and logistics such as high-speed boats, communication equipment, and marine-aircraft to aid patrols along the coastlines of West African states.

Contemporary maritime threats, challenges, and needs are, however, beyond the designs and capabilities of any one state or region. More so, given the fact that West African states have very limited financial,

human resource, and technological capabilities, much as individual and collective states' efforts are very important, the region's collaboration with other actors on the international scene offers the best guarantee to securing the Gulf of Guinea and its oil industries. Presently, West African states, under the aegis of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMSA), and with the support of the United States of America (USA), have evolved the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC). The RMAC is expected to boost maritime security in West Africa (ADF, 2013: 56). West and Central African countries also formed the Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa (MOWCA) in Yaoundé in June 2013. MOWCA is mandated to implement a new Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships, and illicit maritime activity in west and central Africa. Ghana harbours the Regional Maritime University College, and these institutions and initiatives should constitute the substructure of an integrated approach to strengthening West Africa's capacity to combat growing maritime threats such as piracy and smuggling of oil and gas.

### ***Ameliorating Border Disputes***

Naturally, as stated earlier, border disputes are bound to occur between and among oil producing West African littoral states largely as a result of the desire to extend their continental shelves in pursuit of further oil exploration. Even so, Ghana must take all the necessary steps to avoid maritime disputes with neighbouring states through diplomacy. There is a border dispute between Ghana and Cote d' Ivoire as the prospects of additional oil and gas discovery beckon. Two historical antecedents, which generated mutual suspicions, must not be reinforced by a potential maritime dispute, especially the genial relations between Ghana and Cote d' Ivoire. First, the two countries have had strained relations in the past, notably the disharmony of interest between the first post-independence leaders of both countries, Kwame Nkrumah and Houphouet Boigny respectively, over which approach to adopt towards continental unity. And Nkrumah was also accused by Cote d'Ivoire of providing refuge to persons attempting to destabilize that country from within Ghana

(Boafo-Arthur, 1989: 143). Second, in the wake of the 2010 presidential election marred by post-electoral violence in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana had to strenuously deflect suggestions, by the Alassane Ouattara-led administration, about the possible presence of pro-Laurent Gbagbo dissidents within her territorial borders (Newsweek, 2011). This was after reported attacks on key government installations by forces perceived to be supporters of ex-president Gbagbo.

Far from suggesting fractious diplomatic relations between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, it is critical to prevent a scenario which would reinforce existing suspicions, perceived or real. It is against this backdrop that the two countries must pacifically settle all disputes within bilateral arrangements. It is gratifying to note that Ghana has evolved the Boundary Commission Bill, while a Ghana-Cote d'Ivoire Joint Ministerial Committee has been established to address the delimitation of their common maritime border. These efforts notwithstanding, there is the need for a comprehensive sub-regional border regulatory commission that takes into cognisance the aforementioned international regulative regimes such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). As stated earlier, every effort should be made to avoid replicating the Nigeria-Cameroon Bakassi kind of zero-sum border dispute. There is a paramount need to evolve a collectively desired, designed and accepted regional regime to prevent, manage, and resolve (emerging) boundary disputes in prospecting natural resources in West Africa. Such a regime will help foster greater regional cooperation, collaboration, and integration, as well as motivate buoyancy in FDI in the region.

### ***Enabling a Sustained Culture of Corporate Social Responsibility***

There is no gainsaying that oil-exporting countries require a rigorous implementation of CSR legislations. It cannot be denied that oil companies are conscious of their responsibilities to their host countries. However, businesses are primarily concerned with maximising returns on their investments and may dodge their corporate social responsibilities where there are non-incentives to do so. As noted

already, the neglect of CSR stems from the laxity with which policy makers handle non-compliance. For oil exporting countries in West Africa, the discovery of oil and gas in Ghana must serve as a boost to evolve a regional CSR strategy, which will rein-in oil companies that fail to undertake their CSR sincerely. But the key responsibility lies with the governments and civil society organisations of the oil exporting countries in West Africa. There must be conscious efforts at incepting national policy guidelines for oil companies with reference to CSR. The policy guidelines must be shaped by the environmental and green policies, non-discriminatory wage policies between local and expatriate workers, prompt responses to spillage dysfunctions, and must also include a raft of punitive measures such as withdrawal of licenses or considerable fines in the event of non-compliance. Such initiatives must be backed by rigorous, incorruptible implementation of compliance measures. It is only through effective and efficient implementation of CSR strategies at the national level that a regional approach can be evolved. It is gratifying to note that Ghana has started the process of developing an overarching national strategy on CSR. Hopefully, this will inspire a regional policy among all oil exporting countries on CSR.

## **Conclusion**

Discovery of oil and its exploitation essentially raises, primarily, issues of national interest and security, especially regarding its prudent management. However, there are concerns and restraints such as international regulations on the demarcation of (national) economic zones, environmental perils, and transnational security threats that limit the unbridled pursuit of national interests and national security. The sub-region's turbulent natural resource contours can be best managed only when national interest and national security are defined in the larger regional sense. Ghana has thus far given indications of how she intends to equitably manage her fledgling oil and gas industry through, as indicated earlier, the PRML. The jury is still out on whether the purely endogenous policies would become the juggernaut required for Ghana to exorcise the natural resource curse without incorporating a regional dimension to her foreign policy. As has been argued in this article,

Ghana's role in regionalism in West Africa is impeccable. And this implies an onerous responsibility to deter challenges and threats from across the sub-region from annihilating her oil sector, and creating opportunities for the accentuation of regional integration. At this juncture in her history, Ghana is being presented with a menu of choices: ignore morbid symptoms of natural resource endowments and perish, or address regional threats as part of a holistic foreign policy to enable development in both Ghana and the West African sub-region. In approaching the management of its emerging oil industry through the twin-conduit of national and (regional) foreign policies, it will guarantee both the judicious management of natural resources and speedy regional integration.

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## **INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: THE CONTROLLING BEHAVIOURS OF MEN TOWARD WOMEN IN NORTHERN GHANA**

**Paul Issahaku<sup>1</sup>**

### **Abstract**

This paper examines controlling male partner behaviour and its relation to physical and sexual violence in the northern region of Ghana. Controlling behaviours were conceptualized as part of the continuum of intimate partner violence against women. This domain of domestic violence has received little attention in West Africa. A sample of 443 women between the ages of 19 and 49 years recruited at district health facilities across the region was used for the study. Participants, 46% of whom came from rural areas, were visiting these facilities for various healthcare needs. Data were collected using a structured instrument. Descriptive statistics showed that: 79% of participants had experienced past-year controlling behaviour; 27% reported past-year physical violence; and 34% reported past-year sexual violence. Further, multi-variate analysis indicated that physical and sexual violence were significantly related to male controlling behaviours. Given its high prevalence rate, there is need for more attention to men's controlling behaviours in the continuum of men's intimate partner violence. Policy and practice implications of the results are discussed.

**Keywords:** controlling male behaviours; intimate partner violence; women in northern Ghana; patriarchy.

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## **Introduction**

Over the last two decades intimate partner violence (IPV) has received increased scholarly and policy attention. Although some scholars believe that women also perpetrate partner violence (Straus, 2005, 2009), the conclusion that men's violence is the problem is supported by findings of many large-scale multi-country studies on intimate violence (Abramsky, Watts, Garcia-Moreno et al., 2011; Garcia-Moreno, Heise, Jansen, Ellsberg, and Watts, 2005; Hindin, Kishor & Ansara, 2008; Johnson, Ollus & Nevala, 2008; Loseke & Kurz, 2005). IPV is gender-based violence that operates at the interpersonal level. The United Nations ([UN] 1993) defines men's violence against women (VAW) as acts that do or are likely to cause "physical, sexual, or mental harm or suffering to women" (Article 1). Similarly, the World Health Organization (WHO, 2002:5) has defined violence as: "The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual...that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death...or deprivation". As this definition suggests, men's violence against women would usually be understood in terms of their use of force against women, physically or sexually. For this reason, much of the existing literature on partner violence against women, both international (see Abramsky et al., 2011; Devries et al., 2011; Hindin, Kishor & Ansara, 2008; Johnson, Ollus & Nevala, 2008) and Ghanaian (see Adayfio-Schandorf & Sam, 2006; Adinkrah, 2008a; Coker-Appiah & Cusack, 1999; Takyi & Mann, 2006) has focused far more on physical and sexual acts to the neglect of other behaviours that are equally injurious.

Therefore, a lacuna exists in the current literature on a dimension of husbands' violence known as controlling behaviours that this paper aims to address. Following the work of Stark (2007), this paper draws attention to men's controlling behaviour as another important dimension of men's violence against their female partners. Although other scholars have theorized men's violence as a generalized control tool against women (Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Pence & Paymar, 1993; Johnson, 2006), with the exception of Garcia-Moreno et al. (2005) and Villareal (2007) there has been little focus on controlling behaviours as violence,



because they do not involve physical force or assault (Stark, 2007). Men try to restrict their wives' movement or contact with other people. Such actions are referred to as a partner's controlling behaviours and are part of a continuum of violent acts, distinct from physical assault or forced sex. This group of behaviours is the focus of the current study. The paper uses empirical data from northern Ghana to examine the scope of men's controlling behaviours toward their intimate partners.

### **Controlling Behaviours**

Literature on men's controlling behaviours is predominantly North American – USA - (see Coker, Smith, McKeown, & King, 2000; Johnson, 2006; Smith, Smith & Earp, 1999; Smith, Tessaro & Earp, 1995; Stark, 2007). In recent times, however, a growing number of studies have investigated controlling behaviours alongside physical and sexual violence outside of the US (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005; Ghana Statistical Service, 2009; Villareal, 2007). Controlling behaviour is seen as a form of psychological violence called 'battering' (Coker et al., 2000). Coker et al. defined women's psychological vulnerability "as women's continuous perceptions of susceptibility to physical and/or psychological danger, disempowerment, and loss of control in a relationship with a male partner" (2000:554).

Stark (2007) has done elaborate theoretical work on controlling behaviours. Although heavily influenced by the North American cultural context, Stark's work resonates with the situation in other contexts. Stark argues that men use various controlling tactics to oppress women in their interpersonal relations so that with time women will become subordinated. Stark (2007) offers a comprehensive definition of controlling behaviours:

Control is comprised of structural forms of deprivation, exploitation, and command that compel obedience indirectly by monopolizing vital resources, dictating preferred choices, micro-regulating a partner's behaviour,

limiting her options, and depriving her of supports needed to exercise independent judgment (2007:229).

This passage suggests that controlling behaviours are intended to demean women, ensure their compliance, and consolidate male dominance. The Duluth power wheel (Pence & Paymar, 1993) provides some useful insight into controlling behaviours. The model situates men's controlling behaviours within the context of patriarchy. As Pence and Paymar (1993) have noted, male dominance is culturally accepted in society and this gives men the license to want to master and control women. Although Pence and Paymar (1993) were writing about US society, their concerns are relevant to the cultural context of Ghana and other African societies. For example, a number of scholars have noted the cultural predisposition of Ghanaian men and boys to dominate women in the exercise of masculinity (Mann & Takyi, 2009; Takyi & Mann, 2006) and, especially, husbands' quest to maintain control over wives, which has sometimes led to homicide-uxoricide (Adinkrah, 2008a; 2008b, 2012). In addition, Jewkes, Levin and Penn-Kekana (2002) have explained how gender-based inequality against women predisposes them to male control and violence in patriarchal African societies. Jewkes et al. argue that:

ideologies of male superiority legitimate the disciplining of women often for transgressions of conservative female gender roles, and often also the use of force in this. They construct women as legitimate vehicles for the reconfirmation of male powerfulness through beatings, since this is a demonstration of male power juxtaposed with the lesser power of women (2002:1615).

What this means is that men's control behaviour toward women is a gendered performance of masculinity. Two recent studies (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005; Villarreal, 2007) have investigated controlling behaviours as part of violence against women. Using discriminant analysis, Villarreal (2007) showed the distinction and relationship between controlling behaviours and physical violence. Similarly, Garcia-

Moreno et al. (2005), theorizing controlling behaviour as a construct distinct from physical and sexual violence, went on to assess the association between these constructs. Garcia-Moreno and colleagues operationalized controlling behaviour as a 7-item yes or no scale which asked each woman whether her partner restricts her contact with family and friends, insists on knowing her whereabouts at all times, treats her with indifference, restricts her access to health care, accuses her of unfaithfulness, and gets angry when she speaks with other men. They report that women who experienced physical and sexual violence also experienced various forms of controlling behaviours.

For purposes of this paper, controlling behaviour is defined as the rules of behaviour men set up for their partners as well as the means of their enforcement. Some of these include: restricting the woman from going out to visit family or friends; barring her from seeing or talking with other men; requiring her to keep him updated on her whereabouts if she must go out; requiring her to set the meal or give sex at his convenience; and requiring her to take proper care of children and the home, among others. In order to enforce these requirements men use or threaten to use acts of physical, sexual, and emotional violence, such as beatings, forced sex (rape), and humiliation.

To explore the scope of men's controlling behaviour in the administrative northern region of Ghana, the paper builds on the empirical works of Villarreal (2007) and Garcia-Moreno et al. (2005) and is grounded in the theoretical works of Pence and Paymar (1993) and Stark (2007). The study is conducted in the northern region because it is a neglected geographic area in terms of partner violence research in Ghana. With the exception of three national studies (Coker-Appiah & Cusack, 1999; GSS, 2009; Takyi & Mann, 2006) the existing research on intimate partner relationship problems has been done mostly in geographic regions of southern Ghana (e.g., Adayfio-Schandorf, 2006; Adayfio-Schandorf & Sam, 2006; Amoakohene, 2004; Ofei-Aboagye, 1994). Although such studies help us to learn something about partner controlling behaviour and violence in the northern region (see especially

Takyi and Mann [2006]), national studies do not have the capacity to elucidate the differing forms, range and dynamics of controlling behaviours, e.g., the regional variations they take, across the country.

### **Study Context**

Ghana, formerly the Gold Coast, is a coastal country in West Africa which shares borders with Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso. The population of Ghana is estimated to be over 24 million, of which 51% is female (Ghana Statistical Service [GSS], 2012). The research was carried out in the Northern Region, one of the administrative regions within the larger geographic area known as northern Ghana. The Northern Region lies in a semi-arid savanna zone, with rain-fed single-season agriculture as the main economic activity. The region, with an estimated population of over 2 million (GSS, 2012), occupies 29.5% of Ghana's total land mass, is the largest of the ten administrative jurisdictions of the country, and is divided into 20 local government areas – district assemblies. Custom and tradition in the Northern Region place a high premium on marriage and the family institution, in which men are placed above women. For example, although young men and women look forward to marriage and family life, it is the man who should initiate the process, pay the bride price and bring the woman to his father's compound, and act as head and breadwinner (Nukunya, 2003). In addition, a man has permission to take additional wives whereas a woman is expected to commit to one husband (Mahama, 2004). Again, in matters of inheritance and ascension to chieftaincy positions – traditional leadership – men (sons and nephews) rank ahead of women. The unequal placement of women in relation to men in this society provides an important lens to look at men's controlling behaviour and violence towards women.

Ghana has criminalized domestic violence following the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act, 2007 (Act 732) (see Republic of Ghana, 2007) to provide protection to women, children, and other vulnerable groups. The preamble to the Act makes it clear that it is "AN ACT to provide protection from domestic violence particularly for women and

children and for connected purposes” (Republic of Ghana, 2007:3). Act 732 requires that all physical and sexual assault cases in the domestic sphere be reported to the Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit (DOVVSU) of the Ghana Police Service as punishable crimes. However, it is not clear if the law provides adequate protection and relief against all forms of male power and control over women in the intimate sphere.

## **Method**

### ***Participants:***

The sample consisted of 443 women recruited from outpatient populations at six district hospitals across the Northern Region. This non-probability sampling approach is not necessarily purposive or convenient but captures a cross-section of the population of interest at strategic locations (Singleton & Straits, 2005; Watters & Biernacki, 1989). Established ethical guidelines suggested that institutional settings that provide services to women are safe grounds to recruit women into research on a sensitive topic such as violence against women (Jewkes, Watts, Abrahams et al., 2000; WHO, 2001). This guided the choice of district health facilities as recruitment sites. Further, the Research Ethics Board (REB) of the author’s institution advised that to ensure privacy and confidentiality participants be contacted at health centers with daily outpatient populations large enough to provide anonymity. Information received from the regional directorate of health services indicated that these facilities record an average daily outpatient department (OPD) attendance of over 300 people. Women, who visit these facilities for their own health care needs or as caregivers to sick children and relatives, constitute a substantial proportion of the OPD populations.

At the selected hospitals women in the OPD population who were within the age range of 18 to 49 years and in intimate relationships were eligible to participate in the study. Posters designed to advertise the study at recruitment sites were not used because it was feared that doing so could attract the attention of men and possibly jeopardize the participation of some women. With this limited publicity, female nurses became key agents in the recruitment process by offering to introduce the study to

individual women and to encourage participation. They also facilitated data collectors' contact with individual women who expressed interest in participating. The rule-of-thumb was that a woman should be approached in such a way that no intruder would know what was being discussed. Any woman willing to participate following a solicitation in face-to-face contact was included in the sample. Recruitment was done concurrently with data collection. Data collectors did a more detailed introduction of the study, emphasizing its purpose and why they were the people being contacted, as part of the informed consent process. The consent process highlighted the overall importance of the study, the unique contribution of the information they would provide, as well as the potential risks and benefits to individual participants. It also highlighted the voluntary nature of participation and the right to decline participation or to withdraw from the interview at any time without consequence. At the convenience of participants, instrument administration happened immediately following consent or at a later time. All interviews took place in confidential OPD spaces designated for that purpose by management of the health centers.

In all, 600 women were approached to participate in the study. Out of this number 443 women agreed, resulting in a 26% refusal rate. Forty-six per cent of participants came from rural areas, 67% identified themselves as less than 30 years and younger than their partners, 35% identified their marriage as polygynous, and 70% were currently employed. Other characteristics include: mean length of marriage was 9.66 years (SD = 8.47); mean number of children was 2.55 (SD = 1.87); mean years of education for participants was 7.89 (SD = 7.67); mean years of partner education was 9.14 (SD = 8.24); median income of participants was GHS 200 while that of partners was GHS 950; 66% of participants were Muslim; 17% rated their general health as poor; 16% reported their partners take alcohol; 15% reported their partners have concubines; and 22% reported their partners were not currently employed. There is no information on women who refused the survey which would have enabled us analyze differences and similarities between this group and those who participated in the study. However, we know from experience

that in this social context women with some formal education as well as women in urban centers are more likely to participate in this type of research than their non-educated and rural counterparts.

### ***Data collection***

Data reported in this paper was part of a doctoral dissertation research conducted in Northern Ghana in 2011. The paper adopts the World Health Organization's violence against women (VAW) instrument (see Ellsberg & Heise, 2005) which has been validated for wider use in developing countries and was part of Ghana's 2008 demographic and health survey (DHS) (GSS, 2009). However, for purposes of this study, we modified the instrument by way of addition and subtraction. For example, the section on violence during pregnancy was eliminated since our focus was on violence without reference to any event in the life cycle. Also, for cultural relevance, we modified the psychological violence subscale by adding three questions to the original four; refuse to eat your food, refuse to communicate with you, and refuse to perform your relative's funeral. Further, we introduced three simple proxies of mental health problems: thoughts of suicide, sleep disruption, and fear of partner. (These are crude measures of a less studied phenomenon in the Ghanaian context.) The modified instrument was piloted.

Data were collected mainly through face-to-face interviews. Assistants interpreted the English instrument in structured interviews for women who did not have English proficiency. The four main local languages used in these interviews were Dagbanli, Twi, Hausa, and Gonja. On average, interviews lasted for 45 minutes. The data collection team of 12 female assistants consisted of practicing nurses, high school teachers, and upper-year university students. They were given sensitivity training in violence against women research based on the WHO's (2001) guidelines.

Participant safety was taken care of by ensuring, among other things, the privacy and confidentiality of the interviews and ensuring that experienced nurse practitioners were on standby to offer emotional

support to participants. As part of preparation for the study, the data collection team had been given an orientation on solution-focused brief counseling to help participants deal with emotions during the interviews and to refer participants who needed further help. At each of the health centers an experienced female nurse practitioner was on standby to provide support. (Within the study context it was not possible to get practicing psychologists or counselors to provide this support.) Each participant received GHS2 (two Ghana Cedis) as appreciation. Protocols for the study went through full review by the Research Ethics Board of the author's home institution.

***Measures:***

*Controlling behaviours* were measured on a 7-item Yes/No scale. Examples include: tries to keep you from seeing your friends; tries to restrict your contact with your family; insists on knowing where you are at all times, and so on. *Past-year physical violence* was a 6-item Yes or No subscale measuring physically assaultive acts such as: slapping you or throwing something at you that could hurt; pushing you or shoving you or pulling your hair; hitting you with fist or something that could hurt you; kicking you or dragging you or beating you up; choking you or burning you on purpose; and threatening to use or actual use of weapons against you. *Past-year sexual violence* was a 3-item Yes or No subscale. They included: forced you to have sexual intercourse; made you engage in nonconsensual sex due to fear; and forced you to perform something sexual that feels degrading.

Reliability analysis produced Cronbach's alphas of .72 (N = 6) and .61 (N = 3) respectively for the physical and sexual violence subscales. The controlling behaviour scale produced a reliability alpha of .63 (N = 7).

***Data analysis and results:***

Data were analyzed using the statistical package for the social sciences (SPSS) version 20. A frequency distribution analysis was conducted to determine the scope of controlling behaviours as well as partner physical and sexual violence in this sample. The first part of Table 1 presents an



assessment of responses to the controlling behaviour scale while the second part presents summary statistics on past-year controlling behaviour as well as physical and sexual violence experienced by participants. Seventy-nine per cent of the sample (N=443) reported having experienced partner controlling behaviours in the previous 12 months, while 27 and 34% respectively had experienced physical and sexual violence.

**Table 1**

Distribution of past-year partner controlling behaviour, physical and sexual violence (N = 443)

<u>Variable</u>	(% Yes)	(% No)
Places restrictions on seeing friends	24	76
Restricts your contact with family	12	88
Wants to know your whereabouts at all times	59	41
Ignores/treats you with indifference	25	75
Gets angry if you speak with another man	26	74
Suspects you of unfaithfulness	12	88
Restricts your access to healthcare	56	44
<b>Summary</b>		<b>statistics:</b>
Have experienced controlling behaviour	79	21
Have experienced physical violence	27	73
<u>Have experienced sexual violence</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>66</u>

A two-way contingency table analysis was conducted to evaluate whether controlling behaviour was related to partner physical violence among participants. The two variables were past-year controlling behaviour (yes/no) and past-year physical violence (yes/no). Controlling behaviour and physical violence were found to be significantly related, Pearson  $X^2(1, N = 443) = 26.86, p = .01, \text{Cramer's } V = .25$ . The proportion of women reporting controlling behaviour who experienced physical violence was .95. A two-way contingency table analysis was

conducted to evaluate whether controlling behaviour was related to past-year partner sexual violence (yes/no). Controlling behaviour and sexual violence were found to be significantly related, Pearson  $X^2(1, N = 443) = 25.22, p = .01$ , Cramer's  $V = .24$ . The proportion of women reporting controlling behaviour who experienced sexual violence was .92. The result of this analysis suggests that, for this sample of women, the experience of controlling behaviours goes with the experience of physical and sexual IPV.

## **Findings and Discussion**

The scope of men's controlling behaviour over women is very high in northern Ghana. Almost 8 in 10 women experience restrictions placed on them by their husbands. Typical behaviours are: not allowing them to see friends or family, insisting on knowing their whereabouts at all times, getting angry if they speak with another man, and restricting them access to healthcare. These findings are consistent with those of Garcia-Moreno et al. (2005) who found that, across 15 countries, between 21% and 90% of participants had been the targets of one or more of these behaviours. The most reported behaviour in our study was restriction from accessing healthcare (56%), followed by getting angry if they speak with another man (26%), ignoring them when they need his attention most (25%), and restricting them from seeing their friends (24%). The finding that many men restrict their wives' access to and use of health services is consistent with what is reported in a study on family planning and contraceptive use practices in some communities of southern Ghana (Adongo et al., 2013). Adongo and colleagues found that husbands' disapproval was a significant barrier to women's contraceptive use for purposes of birth control.

Women may not perceive these male attitudes as unusual in a patriarchal society like Ghana. Men feel entitled to behave as they do toward their wives (Takyi & Mann, 2006). As Takyi and Mann (2006) argue, "some aspects of [the] culture seem to be shaping men's ...belief systems as to what constitutes appropriate behaviour towards women" (p. 1). This

observation resonates with Nukunya's (2003) sociological analysis of gender relations in the Ghanaian family. Nukunya points out that:

In many Ghanaian societies the traditional position is that women are never wholly independent. A woman must always be under the guardianship of a man, and when she marries, her original guardian hands over some or all of his responsibility for her to her husband (2003:46).

This is probably a pervasive belief among men in northern Ghana, judging from the proportion of women who reported this controlling behaviour. In particular, men's obsession with surveillance over women to ensure that they do not transgress as wives looks like an integral part of the culture of northern Ghana. For example, Takyi and Mann's (2006) study found that, against a southern male reference category, Mole-Dagbani men were twice as likely to justify men's controlling behaviour. The Mole-Dagbani ethnic group is the predominant population group in northern region where the study was done (GSS, 2012). This would explain why men insist on knowing where their wives go and to whom they speak, who they keep as friends and how often they meet, and on determining what illness is serious enough to warrant a visit to the clinic.

Another notable finding of this study is the significant relation between controlling behaviour and physical and sexual IPV, a finding which is similar to what has been reported in a large-scale multi-country study (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2005). Ninety-five per cent of participants in the current study who reported past-year controlling behaviour also reported past-year physical violence, while 92% of those who reported controlling behaviour reported past-year sexual violence. Thus, it seems safe to argue that controlling behaviours form part of the context that facilitates the propagation of physical and sexual IPV. In our view, this situation persists because, despite Ghana's adoption of gender equality legislation and policy (for example, the Domestic Violence law, Act 732, 2007 and the creation of the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs, now Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection), the ideology of

male superiority (Jewkes et al., 2002) still holds sway in the society. Men exercise power and control by making rules and placing restrictions on women, with physical and sexual violence as punishment for violations or as means to enforce compliance. For example: if the man says to the woman, 'keep quiet', and she does not comply, he may mete out a slap; if he says 'don't go out' and she does, she may come back to a beating; or, if he demands sex and she refuses, he may forcefully penetrate her. In this scenario, the silencing of a woman or restriction of her movement is the controlling behaviour whereas the slap or beating is the punishment or means of enforcing compliance. Again, the command to give sex is the controlling behaviour, with the forceful penetration (rape?) as punishment.

The general acceptance of men's authority, in terms of having the final say or using force, in matters of family decision making (Luginaah, 2008; Mann & Takyi, 2009; Takyi & Mann, 2006) allows controlling behaviour and violence to linger in the society. In a beliefs-and-attitudes survey with 2,133 married couples in Ghana, Mann and Takyi (2009) reported that over 50% of women believed that, in matters of family decision making, men should have the last word or can use force to quell opposition. This belief is usually fed by a tradition which socializes women to be submissive and not to question some of the husband's actions. For example, in a focus group discussion based study in northern Ghana (Luginaah, 2008), women were reported as saying that "...it is still culturally unacceptable and disrespectful for a wife to question her husband's habits..." (p. 809). As has been pointed out, if men have right of headship to the family and see themselves as breadwinners, then it is understandable why they should have the final say or why the woman cannot question some of their actions.

Theoretically, controlling behaviours can be thought of as indicators of three concepts; isolation, minimization, and blackmail, which independently, or in combination, can induce emotional pain and a sense of disempowerment (Coker et al., 2000; Pence & Paymar, 1993). Women may feel isolated, segregated or ostracized (Bashford & Strange,

2003; Walters & Karal, 1960) when they are restricted from seeing friends or family, or from accessing healthcare facilities. Although this is suggested, however, the compound housing and communal living arrangements predominant in northern Ghana would make it difficult for a husband to completely isolate his wife from family and friends. Jerusalem and Mittag (1995) have pointed out how isolation induces “psychological crisis” which may profoundly “impact...development, psychosocial functioning, and well-being” (pp.177-178). Further, social pain theorists (see, for example, MacDonald & Leary, 2005) have noted that isolation “triggers painful feelings” (Williams et al., 2005: 8) because of “the perception that one is being excluded from desired relationships...” (McDonald & Leary, 2005:202).

In northern Ghana a man’s motivation to isolate his wife from family and friends can be understood in light of the social convention which gives men control over women’s bodies and services, in many cases, stem from the fact that a bride price has been paid and the rites of transfer performed (Cassiman, 2000; Dery, 1987; Nukunya, 2003), in which case taking time to visit her parents and relations may be seen as interference. For example, among some cultural groups in northern Ghana, marriage literally means “the man “takes the woman”. “The woman does not take the man” (Mahama, 2004:105), or “a man eats a woman” [whereas] a woman enters a man” (Cassiman, 2000: 107). The finding that only a small proportion of women (12%) experienced restrictions on contact with family can be explained by the fact that marriage is a joining of the two families (Bukh, 1979; Cassiman, 2000; Dery, 1987; Mahama, 2004; Nukunya, 1992, 2003; Oppong, 1973; Oppong & Abu, 1987), with the expectation that the couple constitutes the bonding link. Marriage in northern Ghana requires a man and his wife to keep the two families joined together through regular visits, giving of gifts during festive occasions, and participation in family ceremonies such as child naming, enthronement, and funerals. As a result, although the tendency to restrict a woman’s contact with her family by a male partner may be present, such behaviour is restrained because of family visitation obligations entailed by marriage conventions.

Women may also feel ‘minimized’ when they are ignored or treated with indifference and when the partner gets angry because they are speaking with other men. By minimization we mean that women are rendered nonexistent or invisible (Goldberg, 1996), even if temporarily, by the controlling behaviours meted out to them. Goldberg (1996) has described ‘invisibility’ as connoting ‘absence’ in the social realm which can be psychologically damaging. Finally, women may experience as blackmail men’s use of suspicion and accusations of unfaithfulness against them. Blackmail has been described as “an enigma” (Block & McGee, 1996, p.24) and a “paradox” (Block, Kinsella & Hoppe, 2000, p.593) because it is used by various people for parochial gain.

Men in northern Ghana use suspicion or accusations of infidelity or witchcraft as a powerful blackmail weapon against perceived recalcitrant women; accusations of infidelity or witchcraft can attract all manner of ill-treatment for women (Mahama, 2004; Nukunya, 2003; Schaubert, 2007). Indeed, women who resist a man’s surveillance as well as defy their jealousy by continuing to go out without providing information on their movements, or engage in conversations with other men, become subjects of suspicion. Suspicion works well in this cultural context because it is often conflated with the truth in the court of social conviction. Often, if a man accuses his wife of infidelity or witchcraft, the family and community quickly conclude that she is guilty. Women dread the suspicion or accusation of infidelity because to be called a prostitute is socially damaging. If a woman is divorced on account of infidelity it may be difficult for her to get another partner. Likewise, as Nukunya (2003: 60) has pointed out, “As far as Ghana is concerned, the reality of witchcraft is not in doubt...” and, for northern Ghana in particular, “Witchcraft allegations are a widespread phenomenon...that often leads to the banishment, torturing, lynching and even killing of the accused persons” (Schauber, 2007: 116). In addition, as Mahama (2004: 121) has noted, “under Dagomba customary law” the easiest way for a man to “obtain a decree for divorce” is to accuse the woman of witchcraft. It is possible that women perceive men’s use of suspicion as a form of blackmail intended to keep them docile and submissive. All of

the above possible implications of controlling behaviours merit further investigation in future research.

The above discussion and recommendations for further research reflect the fact that this study has a number of limitations. First, the sample was not randomly selected and so the results cannot be generalized to include all sectors of society in the northern region. Secondly, results of a cross-sectional study such as this one can only speak for the specific point in time when the study was conducted. Finally, the measures were self-reports which suffer from social desirability errors. However, 443 is a reasonably large sample of women and recruiting from health centers which attract a cross-section of the general population ensured that some diversity was reflected in the data. Therefore, it would be argued that findings from this study are a reasonable approximation of the situation of women experiencing partner violence in northern Ghana.

## **Conclusion**

Findings reported in this paper indicate that male controlling behaviours constitute a significant issue for women living in the northern region of Ghana. These behaviours co-exist with acts of physical and sexual violence. Men's controlling behaviours toward women take the form of restricted contact with friends, family, healthcare providers, and other men. They also come in the form of being ignored, treated with indifference, and being suspected of infidelity or witchcraft. Conceptually, such controlling behaviours lead to isolation, minimization, and blackmail, contributing to the disempowerment of women. It is hoped that scholars will find these data helpful in developing models of partner violence that include controlling behaviours as a key dimension – while being sensitive to the fact that such behaviours will take very different forms in different sectors of society.

These survey findings suggest that policy and legislation be targeted towards a range of male controlling behaviours which support acts of physical or sexual violence. Ghanaian legislation and policy needs to

take account of how men isolate and cut women off from friends, family and general support networks; mount surveillance on women; blackmail women into submission for fear of social repercussions; police and control women's professional, business, and recreational interactions with other men; restrict women's access to health care by determining what type of sickness merits a visit to the clinic and when to do so; and decide when a girl should marry, as well as how many and how often she should have children. Such findings call for gender equality policies as well as a change in traditional practices that condone men's controlling behaviours. Naturally, tradition in Ghana is changing (Nukunya, 2003). This is due to factors such as globalization, migration, and urbanization which have disrupted values underpinning the traditional gender regime. We can build on this trend to push for gender equality and eradication of controlling behaviours. In addition, recent legislation, including Act 732, 2007, which criminalizes all forms of domestic abuse, and the Children's Act, Act 560, 1998, which forbids betrothal, forced, and early marriage of girls (Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, 1998, 2007) are all bases upon which women can begin to resist controlling behaviours.

Perhaps most importantly, innovative programs are needed that focus on empowering women. Policies and programs that give access to paid work and income generating opportunities so that women can gain some economic independence will go a long way in enabling them resist men's control and violence. Although there are a number of microfinance schemes that promote income earning activities among women in the northern part of Ghana, there is little visibility of the public sector in this regard. Most of the schemes are operated by non-governmental organizations who work with foundation grants and private sector financial institutions. There is need for a policy which coordinates efforts of these non-state actors and which commits government, through the decentralized agencies, to playing a lead role in promoting women's economic empowerment. A portion of the District Assemblies' Common Fund (DACF) should be earmarked for small loans and capacity-building for women. This can be channeled through identifiable groups, such as Christian Mothers, market women's associations, and village level self-



help groups. Efforts to promote women's economic empowerment should be situated within a policy that ensures they receive an appreciable level of formal education – a minimum of secondary school education – before they get into marital unions. Educated women are empowered women who can bargain for equality with men. As has been reported in a study on the gendered nature of HIV transmission in northern Ghana, "If the young girls are not educated, they will continue to suffer the same plight as their mothers" (Luginaah, 2008:811).

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## **ATTAINMENT OF THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL OF POVERTY REDUCTION IN NIGERIA – AN APPRAISAL**

**Lotanna Ernest Emediegwu<sup>1</sup> & Anthony Monye-Emina<sup>2</sup>**

### **Abstract**

Fifteen years ago, the largest-ever gathering of heads of State and Government, under the aegis of the United Nations (UN), adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). One of the fundamental objectives of the MDGs is to free countries, especially developing countries, from the poverty trap. Despite the enormous resources and efforts expended by the Nigerian government for the purpose of achieving the MDG1 of halving the proportion of poor persons by 2015, statistics show that no progress has been made. The authors use descriptive analysis to examine how and why Nigeria has been unable to achieve this fundamental goal of poverty eradication. This challenge is connected with the uncoordinated policy actions in areas that MDGs aim to address as well as the problems of poverty, corruption, and focus on election issues etc. The paper recommends that the country will attain the goal of poverty reduction if the government develops and implements pro-people poverty reduction programmes and policies.

**Keywords:** Millennium Development Goals, Poverty reduction, National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, 7-Point Agenda, Corruption.

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## **Introduction**

The quest to eradicate extreme poverty has been identified as the most critical challenge facing the world today, particularly developing countries. Extreme poverty represents great human misery. Poverty is the condition of being poor: it reduces the social and psychological prestige of its victims. It is also responsible for several crimes and vices. Moreover, severe ill health is both a cause and consequence of poverty, and addressing it must be a top priority of international development (Todaro and Smith, 2012). This is why its eradication topped the list of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

It is undeniable that the world today enjoys unprecedented progress in development. People are living much longer and better lives, and in the last 50 years poverty has fallen more than in the previous 500 years. In spite of these laudable achievements, it is acknowledged that the progress with ending poverty has been stymied in some regions while the number of people living in poverty continues to grow in some other regions (Millennium Development Goals Report, 2010; United Nations Development Program, 2008). Due to the centrality of poverty eradication to the progress of any nation, Edoh (2003) suggests that a nation's priority must be to end poverty and satisfy the needs of all its citizens without compromising the opportunity for the future generations to attain the same objectives.

According to Chandy and Gertz (2011), poverty remains stubbornly pervasive as 1.3 billion people worldwide continue to live in extreme poverty. As evidenced by the condition in Nigeria, the incidence of poverty is possible even in the midst of wealth. At present, Nigeria is rated as one of the poorest countries in the world with approximately 90 million people living in absolute poverty (coming after China and India in the number of poor people). It is sad to note that poverty in Nigeria is severe and endemic, so that most Nigerians now see it as a way of life. In fact, in 2010, 93.3 percent of Nigerians considered themselves to be poor. It is, however, paradoxical that a country with abundant human and mineral resources is reckoned as one of the poorest nations in the world

– rich country, poor people (Anger, 2010; UNDP, 2008; Adejuwon and Tijani, 2012; Vanguard, 2015).

There have been efforts to reduce poverty since 2000. Five out of every ten Nigerians still live in poverty (MDG Report, 2014). In fact, an average Nigerian is said to be living below one dollar per day, with about 80 percent of these poor residing in rural areas. Considering the size and diversity of Nigeria, it is pertinent to note that the country's success in the attainment of the MDGs will have considerable regional impact (UNDP, 2008).

According to Mahammed (2006), the MDGs goals, targets and indicators relating to poverty reduction are quite relevant in the case of Nigeria. As a member of the United Nations, Nigeria keyed into the MDGs and subsequently produced a policy document in 2004 called the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) to further see to the achievement of the MDGs. Specifically, NEEDS has the following actionable goals: wealth creation; employment generation; poverty reduction; and value re-orientation. From these, it can be inferred that it was intended to meet some of the goals of the MDGs, especially poverty reduction. More than ten years have passed since the initiation of NEEDS, but the poverty situation in the country remains largely the same (Oshelowo, 2011).

This paper appraises the performance of Nigeria on the first MDG. The paper is divided into five sections. The succeeding section (Section 2) outlines the MDGs and Global Response to the Poverty Challenge while Sections 3 deals with the poverty situation in Nigeria. Nigeria's poverty reduction measures are examined in section 4 while section 5 comprises the summary and policy recommendations.

### **MDGs and Global Response to the Poverty Challenge**

The commitment of the world to the problem of poverty is briefly summed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration: *“We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and*

*dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty.*” (Todaro and Smith, 2012) In the United Nations 2000 Millennium Declaration, eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 18 time-bound targets were defined to guide countries and the international community on the road to development. Key areas of development, such as eradication of poverty and hunger, education, gender equality, various dimensions of health and environmental sustainability were identified. Subsequent to the Declaration, 48 quantitative indicators and several sub-indicators were defined to monitor countries’ progress toward the goals and targets.

The MDGs, which before 2014 were the strongest statement of the international community about ending global poverty, were developed in consultation with the developing countries to ensure that they addressed their most pressing problem – poverty. In addition, key international agencies, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), all helped develop the Millennium Declaration and so have a collective policy commitment to attacking poverty directly.

Indeed, the top priority of the Millennium Declaration is to tackle poverty and reverse the deterioration in human development. While the developed countries on their part would increase assistance to developing countries, particularly through Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), developing countries were required to prepare bold national strategies and work plans to achieve the MDGs.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, in its MDG Report (2013), predicted that all developing regions except Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Asia and parts of Eastern Europe and Central Asia are likely to achieve the MDG targets. However, as far back as 2004, it was considered unlikely that Nigeria would be able to meet the goals related to eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. Nevertheless, progress towards the MDGs was given a huge boost in 2005 when the Federal Government pledged to allocate savings from the Paris Club Debt Relief

Deal to pro-poor programmes and projects. Against this backdrop the government set up the Virtual Poverty Fund to report on debt relief expenditures. Since 2006, on an annual basis, about \$1 billion has been allocated to support progress in health, education, water and sanitation, environment, energy, housing, women's rights, HIV/AIDS, social safety nets, the conditional grant scheme to state governments and the provision of rural infrastructure.

Unfortunately, the progress report on MDGs released by the UN in 2013 indicates that the rate of progress towards the attainment of Goal 1 is slow. The potential of meeting the target is rated as average, while the supportive policy environment for achieving the goal is rated as weak. Imoudu (2012) supports the above claim by asserting that while the government has initiated several supportive programmes in defence of the poor, such as the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), the Social Welfare Services Scheme (SOWESS) and the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), the facts on ground suggest that these efforts are not accompanied by commitment, transparency and determination. That is why there has been no significant change in the number of the poor over the past two decades.

## **POVERTY IN NIGERIA**

The poverty situation in Nigeria is quite worrisome, especially considering the resources the country possesses. According to the World Bank (2011), the incidence of poverty is even worse when measured using the international poverty line. In 2010 the percentage of the population living below \$1.00 a day was 61.2% while those living below \$1.25 a day constituted 68% in 2010. In the same year, the population living below \$2.00 a day was 84%. Gbosi (2004) lends credence to the disturbing poverty situation by positing that the incidence of poverty is very high among the unemployed, uneducated women and rural dwellers.

Sub-national variations are a critical dimension to the poverty situation in Nigeria. The disparities are quite high across geopolitical zones, states and rural–urban areas and reflect the heterogeneous economic and social circumstances at the sub-national level.

**Table 3.1: Headcount Poverty Ratio in the Six Geopolitical Zones, 2010**

<b>Geopolitical Zone</b>	<b>Poverty Rate (Percentage)</b>
North-West	70
North-East	69
North-Central	59.5
South-East	58.7
South-South	55.8
South-West	49.8


*Source: MDG Report, 2013*

The statistics in Table 3.1 above shows that, in general, poverty is more pervasive in the North than in the South of the country. Not surprisingly, this situation is further compounded by the increase in the country's population, thus resulting in an increase in the growing number of the poor that rose from 88.9 million in 1991 to 110 million in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). This population-poverty nexus has been supported by several empirical studies such as Ahlburg (1996), Aniceto (2003), and Steven (2008), amongst others.

Figure 3.1 below shows the national poverty rate in comparison to the poverty rates in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the world. Starting from 53.9 % in 1986, the national poverty rate rose to 68.5% in 1996 before falling to 63.1% in 2004. Two years after the inception of NEEDS, it rose to an all-time high of 70% in 2006 before reducing by about 3 percent points



to 67% in 2010. This is a far cry from the expected poverty rate of 30% if the goal of poverty reduction is to be achieved. Figure 3.1 further shows that the poverty rate in Nigeria is always above the regional and global poverty rates. While there is impressive progress towards poverty reduction globally, as seen in the downward trend of its poverty rate curve, the reverse is the case nationally. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the poverty rate in Nigeria has always been above that of the region for the years under consideration. Whereas the region's poverty rate has consistently hovered around 50%, that of Nigeria did not fall below 50% between 1986 and 2010: rather, it averaged 64% for the period under review.



*Source: World Bank (2013).*

Table 3.2 below shows the trend of poverty incidence of West African countries from 1981 to 2011. In 2005, Nigeria, with a poverty incidence of 62.4%, was the fourth poorest country in the sub-region. This is worrisome, considering the fact that countries with fewer resources than Nigeria such as the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau and Togo

maintained a less than 50% poverty rate for the same period. The MDG Report (2014) indicates that as at 2010, four countries accounted for around 52% of the poor in the continent of Africa: Nigeria (25.89%), Democratic Republic of the Congo (13.6%), Tanzania (6.8%) and Ethiopia (5.2%). If this trend continues, Nigeria will likely become home to more poor people than any other country: a burden that India faced since 1999 (Chandy and Gertz, 2011).


**Table 3.2: Proportion of the population living on less than \$1.25 a day in countries of West Africa (1981-2011)**

<b>COUNTRIES</b>	<b>1981</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>Ranking as at 2005</b>
Liberia	74.5	83.2	86.1	NA	1 <sup>st</sup>
Guinea	86.6	92.6	69.8	40.9	2 <sup>nd</sup>
Niger	57.4	65.0	65.9	40.8	3 <sup>rd</sup>
<b>Nigeria</b>	<b>47.2</b>	<b>49.1</b>	<b>62.4</b>	<b>62.0</b>	<b>4<sup>th</sup></b>
Burkina Faso	73.0	61.9	55.0	NA	5 <sup>th</sup>
Mali	81.5	85.2	51.4	50.4	6 <sup>th</sup>
Benin	53.5	66.0	50.0	51.6	7 <sup>th</sup>
Sierra Leone	59.4	63.1	49.9	56.6	8 <sup>th</sup>
Guinea-Bissau	31.2	41.3	42.5	NA	9 <sup>th</sup>
Togo	35.2	33.8	38.7	52.5	10 <sup>th</sup>
Senegal	68.3	65.8	35.5	34.1	11 <sup>th</sup>
Gambia	64.3	67.9	31.3	48.4	12 <sup>th</sup>
Ghana	48.9	50.7	30.0	NA	13 <sup>th</sup>
Ivory Coast	6.7	17.3	20.4	NA	14 <sup>th</sup>
Cape Verde	52.3	36.0	18.4	NA	15 <sup>th</sup>
Mauritania	38.9	45.9	13.4	NA	16 <sup>th</sup>

*Sources: World Bank (2011).*

A feature of poverty in Nigeria is that it is more prevalent, more severe and deeper in the rural than in the urban areas throughout the period 1980-2010. Figure 3.2 below shows that 28% of rural people compared to 17% of urban dwellers lived below the poverty line. By 1985, due to rural-urban dynamics, its poor management and the attendant socio-

environment impacts, the urban poverty rate more than doubled, as it rose sharply to 38%. Similarly, the rate of rural poverty increased remarkably from 28% to 51% during the period. In 1992, the urban poverty rate remained almost unchanged at 37.5%, while the rural poverty rate declined to 46%. By 1996, both urban and rural poverty rates had increased to 59% and 72% respectively. In 2010, ten years after the inauguration of the MDGs, the urban poverty rate was 51.2% while the rural equivalent was 69 percent. Some of the reasons advanced for this situation suggest that historically government policy has been biased against rural areas; rural areas are heavily dependent on agricultural production, which in Africa is characterized by low labor productivity and hence low incomes; and natural disasters such as flooding and drought tend to affect rural areas more severely than they do urban areas (Anyanwu, 2012).




**Sources:** Anyanwu (2012); MDG Report (2013)

This development is not surprising due to hardships and the lack of access to basic necessities such as sanitation and health care services that rural dwellers have to contend with. Poverty has also taken an alarming dimension as the population of the urban poor is fast increasing due to the rapid growth of the population as well as the rural-urban dynamics.

Addressing this phenomenon is important for rapid progress (MDG Report, 2013; Nigeria MDGs Report, 2013).

Poverty, hitherto, was more pronounced in female-headed households in 1980 (29.9% as against 29.1% for the male-headed households). This scenario, however, has changed from 1985 and male headed households have maintained a higher poverty rate till date. The widest gap – 14.7% – was in 2004 when the national poverty rate of male-headed households was 58.2% against 43.5% for female-headed households (See Figure 3.3). As Anyanwu (2010) noted, this reversal in the gendered poverty trend was probably because women had access to better jobs because of higher educational attainment.



Sources: Anyanwu, 2010; and NBS, 2012

### Nigeria's Poverty Reduction Measures and the MDGs

In a bid to overcome poverty in Nigeria, several policies and programmes have been initiated from 1970s till date. The programmes

include: Operation Feed the Nation (OFN); the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI); the Better Life Programme (BLP); the National Directorate of Employment (NDE); the Family Support Programme (FSP); the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP); the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP); and the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS), among others. These aim to ameliorate the suffering of the people by providing them employment opportunities and access to credit to enable them establish their own businesses.

### ***Pre-MDG Poverty Reduction Programmes***

The Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) programme which was initiated in 1979 was home-grown and targeted at food production and self-sufficiency in rural areas. The irony with the programme, according to Arogundade et al. (2011), was that graduates trained in the theory of farming had to teach farming practice to farmers who make their living on farming. The scheme's only success was in creating awareness of food shortages and the need to tackle the problem. Thereafter, the DFRRI was established in 1986 targeted at food production, rural development, skill acquisition and micro business development (Orji, 2005).

The National Directorate of Employment (NDE) programme was established in 1986 to complement the efforts of other poverty and rural development measures. It was specifically to train unskilled young Nigerians including Youth Corp members in skill acquisition and entrepreneurship development. The need for this interest in skill acquisition can be traced to the drastic reduction in oil prices and the economic crises that emanated from the global recession in the 1980s. Arogundade et. al., (2011) assert that a major drawback on NDE's schemes was that there was no follow-up programme for beneficiaries. Many of them did not utilise the skills acquired and did not properly invest the loans they received, thus ending up worse-off. While the Directorate asserts that it has to date disbursed about \$260,842,234.21 for its various programmes, only 24.4% of this total, or \$63,885,523.58, was recovered from beneficiaries.

Shortly after the establishment of the DFRRI, the Better Life Programme (BLP) was introduced, which aimed at a gendered perspective in anti-poverty measures. The programme was targeted at elevating the living standards of rural women. Such a targeted but isolated approach to poverty problems in the rural areas failed to wholly tackle the problems. Again, the usual absence of inputs from the targeted beneficiaries at the rural level during programme design and conceptualisation was noticeable (Orji, 2005; World Bank, 1999). The shortcomings associated with the BLP necessitated the Family Support Programme (FSP) in 1994. The FSP aimed at broadening the coverage of the BLP and also sharpening its focus. Emphasis therefore was shifted to the role of the family in rural development.

According to Okoroafor and Nwaeze (2013), the Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) was an interim measure initiated early in 2000 to address the problems of rising unemployment and crime wave. It was ultimately aimed at improving the welfare of Nigerians. Thus, the government earmarked 50% of Poverty Alleviation Programmes (PAP) jobs for youths; 25% for women and the remaining 25% for men, with special preference for the destitute and the disabled. After appraising previous poverty alleviation programmes, the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) was introduced in early 2001. This bold step marked a paradigm shift from the traditional concept of alleviation to eradication through four different schemes: the Youth Empowerment Scheme (YES), the Rural Infrastructures Development Scheme (RIDS), the Social Welfare Services Scheme (SOWESS) and the Natural Resource Development and Conservation Scheme (NRDCS).


### ***MDG-Inspired Poverty Reduction Programmes: Challenges and Prospects***

As a member of the United Nations, Nigeria keyed into the MDGs. Before 2004, progress towards the MDGs in Nigeria was slow. This is because while all the tiers of government funded programmes and projects related to the MDGs from their annual budgets, there was little or no coordination. In 2004, however, the Federal Government, by way of a national response to the lingering problem of poverty, integrated the

MDGs into Nigeria's comprehensive economic development framework, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). NEEDS and its anti-poverty measures was an improvement on the previous anti-poverty efforts. The Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP) and the Poverty Eradication Programme (PEP) aimed at reducing poverty among the youth by creating gainful employment through the Youth Employment Scheme (YES), and the development of rural infrastructure and natural resources. As a home-grown strategy, NEEDS has been likened to Nigeria's version of the MDGs (Oshelowo, 2011; Ogunmola and Badmus, undated).

Specifically, NEEDS has the following actionable goal: wealth creation; employment generation; poverty reduction and value re-orientation. To reduce poverty, NEEDS set the following broad targets, indicated in Figure 4.1 below:

**Figure 4.1: NEEDS Actionable Anti-Poverty Goals**



**Source: Aigbokhan, 2008**

To prioritize its spending in line with the Goals, the Medium Term Sector Strategies (MTSS) were developed to guide the preparation and implementation of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), with 57 percent of total capital spending earmarked for the MDGs related sectors (Nigeria MDGs Report, 2013; Kolawole et al., 2014).

NEEDS, as a national framework of action, had its equivalent at the state and local government levels as State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (SEEDS) and Local Government Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (LEEDS) respectively.

To further demonstrate the government's commitment to the achievement of the MDGs and give the effort more visibility, the Millennium Development Goals Office was established and a Senior Special Assistant to the President (SSAP) was appointed to head the Office. The President also established a Presidential Committee for the Assessment and Monitoring of the MDGs. The members of the Committee (chaired by the President) include state governors' representatives, the National Planning Commission, local and international non-governmental organizations and ministers of implementing agencies of debt relief gains programmes and projects.

In 2007, a Seven-Point Agenda for national development was introduced. The main objectives and principles of the agenda include improving the general well-being of Nigerians and making the country one of the biggest economies in the world by the year 2020. The major policy thrust of government then was in the areas of critical infrastructure; Niger Delta development; food security; human capital development; land tenure reform; national security, law and order; and poverty alleviation and wealth creation. The government explicitly stated that there would be consistency between its 7-Point Agenda and the MDGs (See Table 1) (Nigeria MDGs Report, 2013; Oshelowo, 2011; Dode, 2010).



**Table 4.1: Alignment of the MDGs and the 7-Point Agenda**

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGs)	7-POINT AGENDA (Medium Term Development Strategy)
<i>Goal 1</i> Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Niger Delta development</li> <li>➤ Food security</li> <li>➤ Human capital development</li> <li>➤ Land tenure reform</li> <li>➤ Poverty alleviation and wealth creation</li> </ul>
<i>Goal 2</i> Achieve universal primary education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Human capital development</li> </ul>
<i>Goal 3</i> Promote gender equality and empower women	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ National security, law and order</li> </ul>
<i>Goal 4</i> Reduce child mortality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Human capital development</li> </ul>
<i>Goal 5</i> Improve maternal health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Human capital development</li> </ul>
<i>Goal 6</i> Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Human capital development</li> </ul>
<i>Goal 7</i> Ensure, environmental sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Niger Delta development</li> <li>➤ Land tenure reform</li> <li>➤ National security, law and order</li> </ul>
<i>Goal 8</i> Develop a global partnership for development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Land tenure reform</li> </ul>

**Source: Nigeria MDGs: Countdown Strategy 2010 to 2015**

From Table 4.1 above, it is evident that most of the key issues in the 7-point agenda are geared towards the realization of the first MDG – poverty and hunger eradication. This suggests that the main thrust of the 7-Point Agenda *vis-à-vis* the MDGs is poverty reduction. However, Nigeria’s MDGs Report (2013) acknowledged that progress on MDG 1 has been slow with respect to the target of halving the \$1.25 a day poverty prevalence. With poverty at 68 percent (2010), it is unlikely that the 2015 target of 30 percent will be met.

With regards to the initiation and the implementation of NEEDS as a poverty-intervention strategy, it is disheartening to discover that the Nigerian government did not meet these targets as contained in the policy document. Most Nigerians do not have access to safe drinking water or primary health care, and the rate of unemployment is rising. This paints a picture of the failure of NEEDS as a poverty reduction policy (Anger, 2010). So far, the Nigerian government’s score sheet is

unimpressive, to the extent that in 2009 the House of Representatives threatened to stop financial allocation to any Ministry or parastatal that failed to implement the MDGs (*The Vanguard*, 2009). AFRODAD (2005) reports that despite rapid advances by some countries that show that the MDGs are achievable; most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa including Nigeria are yet to mobilize resources, political and financial support to meet specific global challenges. These positions reflect the practical reality in Nigeria. The MDG (2014) report lends credence to the above statement by stating that the current rate of progress is too slow to meet the target benchmarked for 2015. If that pace was maintained, poverty incidence will reduce to 43% instead of 21.4% earmarked to be attained by the close of 2015.

The effective implementation of these programmes has been challenged by quite a number of factors. Ovie and Akpomuvie (2011) divided these challenges into two broad categories – policy design and implementation; and policy acceptability. Most of these policies do not actually address the needs of the people they were designed for, especially the rural populace. Consequently, most of the policies were not whole-heartedly accepted by the poor since they were not consulted during their formulation.

Furthermore, according to Orji (2005), the anemic socio-economic condition in the country tends to swallow up any seeming benefit that might even have resulted from such programmes. The increasing rate of terrorism, conflicts of diverse origin, systemic corruption, institutional failures, epileptic power supply, and struggle for resource control combine to destabilize the economy and scare away foreign investment thus making poverty to rise.

The Nigerian economy is intricately intertwined with the developments in the oil sector from the oil boom era of the early 1970s. Oil accounts for more than 95 percent of the country's GDP and 75 percent of its revenues (World Bank, 2013). All these statistics underscore the fact that the oil sector has been the backbone of the Nigerian economy since the

1970s. Consequently and unfortunately, the country's fiscal policy is strongly controlled by the oil volume, value and volatility in price. Hence, a major snag in the country's developmental effort to alleviate poverty, according to IMF (2005), is the boom and bust mode of economic management, encouraged by the dominance of oil in the economy.

Another major challenge to sustainable poverty reduction in the country, according to Nigeria Millennium Development Goal Report (2015), is the very limited reduction effect of economic growth. Hence, while the country recorded largely impressive growth rates in the past decade and in more recent times, the growth structure was faulty: it was not entirely inclusive; it did not generate employment and therefore did not reduce poverty. The sector driving the growth process is vital in reducing poverty. For instance, the significant reduction in poverty in Ethiopia and Rwanda in recent times has been linked to the rapid growth in agriculture. This is not the case for extractive sector-driven economies such as Angola, Nigeria and Zambia, which are mostly enclave sectors and not integrated into the rest of the economy (MDG Report, 2014).

Igbuzor (2011) posits that another obstacle confronting the MDG report is the paucity of accurate, reliable and credible statistics. For example, the latest statistics on poverty in Nigeria dates back to 2010. We do agree that between 2010 and 2015, a lot of changes – political, economic, and social – occurred. These might have driven poverty in any direction; however, due to the unavailability of credible data, carrying out such an analysis will be a herculean task.

## **Post-2015: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – A Précis**

As the MDGs expired at the end of 2015, the SDGs are the next generation MDGs, establishing a new round of development targets for the world. They build upon, follow and expand the MDGs. The MDGs inspired the development of the SDGs. The MDGs have been criticized for being too narrow. They also failed to consider the root causes of

poverty, or gender inequality, or the holistic nature of development. The SDGs, which were developed as a panacea for the short-comings of the MDGs, are supposed to be more inclusive and sustainable.

The SDGs were adopted by the UN summit in September 2015 and became globally applicable beginning in January 2016. The SDGs consist of 17 sustainable development goals, 169 targets and over 500 indicators covering a wide range of development issues, ranging from ending poverty and hunger, to improving health and education, making cities more sustainable, combating climate change, and protecting the environment. It also requires annual reporting of high-quality data from all countries. These new set of goals, the SDGs, aims to end poverty and hunger by 2030.

Given that the tenure of the MDGs has expired without Nigeria meeting the poverty reduction goal, the SDGs era presents another global opportunity to end poverty. However, in the context of the SDGs agenda, given its broadness and inclusiveness, there is the need to devise strategies to overcome the mitigating factors that hindered the achievement of the MDGs, otherwise, the SDGs will only amount to a mere change of nomenclature.

### **Summary and Policy Recommendations**

The main arguments advanced in this paper can now be summarized with concluding remarks. The poverty scourge can be viewed as the world's greatest foe which if defeated can mean freedom for humanity. Nigeria, in the same vein, is not isolated from the call to free man from the poverty trap. This, according to the MDG Report (2014), is an indication that rapid economic growth has failed to improve the living conditions of many Nigerians. This tends to suggest that the structure of growth matters.

Poverty has been the main factor that has instigated several regimes to initiate several policy responses in Nigeria. Unfortunately, they have not translated into the desired results. From the foregoing discussions, it is

apparent that Nigeria is jaded with poverty and economic underdevelopment. Though the MDGs provide a platform for attacking poverty, the situation from the Nigerian perspective indicates that there are still glaring constraints and challenges. In the view of Anyanwu (2012), Nigeria is one of the African countries that will not be able to reach the MDG poverty target by 2015. The real challenge that militates against the realization of the MDGs is policy coordination and implementation, because adequate budgetary allocations have been made by the government.

Factors that have militated against the objectives of the several poverty reduction programmes include weak governance, insecurity, rapidly growing population, non-inclusive and jobless economic growth, widening income inequality, social conflict and gender, intersectoral and environmental issues (IMF, 2005; Nigeria, 2015).

The year 2015 has come and gone: Nigeria did not achieve the MDG 1. The chorus sung now by all nations, including Nigeria, is the SDGs. What then is the way forward? We, first of all, clearly state that the country's problem is not lack of requisite resources. There are sufficient resources to meet the SDGs target by 2030, but what is of utmost importance is the need to formulate, implement and coordinate pro-people economic policies; good governance and best practices in political engineering; coupled with a strong determination to change the nature and structure of Nigeria's economic growth and dependency. Specifically, the following are recommended if Nigeria is to achieve the SDG of poverty elimination in the nearest future:

First and most importantly, the government should tackle the stubborn problem of corruption. This is because weak governance, especially corruption and mismanagement of public resources, tends to discourage private investment. The institutions established to combat corruption should be well equipped financially and statutorily. Moreover, they should be granted absolute independence from the executive arm of government if they are to perform their functions without fear or favour.

Second, accountability and transparency should be the hallmark of all government processes and transactions. This can be made possible if government establishes credible and efficient institutions for proper public resource management, while reinforcing the existing ones. This is to ensure efficient and proper utilization of public resources with the primary aim of preventing, or at least, minimizing inefficiencies and waste.

Third, for any meaningful comparison to be made, the question of how to generate credible data periodically, for instance, every 5 years, has to be answered. This demands reinforcing national and sub-national capacities for data generation and processing, especially at sectoral levels.

Fourth, an architectural change in the structure of the Nigerian economy is paramount. Oil dependence has been the basis of Nigeria's economic growth. To achieve the goal of poverty reduction in Nigeria, the economy has to be diversified away from its monoculture nature, while the industrial sector, which is seen as the engine of growth, needs to be expanded.

Fifth, since poverty is more pronounced in the rural areas than in the urban centres, the participation of rural people is a *sine qua non* for poverty alleviation. This implies that they should be involved in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the programmes and policies targeted towards aiding them. In other words, these policies should be pro-poor in approach. Given that most rural dwellers migrate to the city to escape poverty, if the problem of rural poverty is solved, it would indirectly reduce urban poverty and its associated vices.

Sixth, strong coordination between and among the tiers of government is necessary. Nigeria needs to conquer weak coordination between and among tiers of government occasionally brought about by the system's dynamics. This underscores the need to adopt a framework that will enhance goals, targets and progress synchronisation.

In conclusion, everyone, the government at all levels, the organized private sector, the international community and the citizens, have a role to play if Nigeria is to join the comity of nations which will be celebrated for achieving the foremost and most important SDG – poverty eradication.

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# **ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE DANISH-DANGBE ENCOUNTER ALONG THE EASTERN COASTAL BELT OF GHANA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING DANGBE CULTURE**

**Fritz Biveridge<sup>1</sup>**

## **Abstract**

This research presents results of historical archaeological investigations undertaken along the eastern coastal belt of Ghana on how the Danish-Dangbe encounter which spanned circa, 1650–1800, shaped the socio-economic history of the indigenous Dangbe who occupied the area. Data for the study was derived primarily from archaeological, historical and ethno-historical investigations conducted at Kpone, Prampram, Segra and Ningo. The study revealed that European cuisines, dress codes, weaponry and architecture constituted some major material culture embraced by the ancestors of the Dangbe. The large quantum and wide array of European trade goods recovered from the excavations is also evident of the importance of commercial relations that developed between the two groups during the period.

**Keywords:** Excavations, Faunal remains, Lifeways, Cross-cultural encounter, Material remains.

## **Introduction**

The main thrust of this research was to use archaeological data from Prampram, Ningo, Kpone and Segra (Map 1) to deepen our knowledge and understanding of how the Danish-Dangbe encounter (circa, 1650 –

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1800) impacted the material culture of the indigenous Dangbe who occupy the area.

Three reasons informed the selection of the four settlements for investigations. First, several early European records and ethno-historical sources of the people of Kpone, Prampram and Ningo intimated that their ancestors encountered / interacted with the Danes during the period covered by the study. Second, the original occupation quarters of their ancestors remain archaeologically unexplored to-date. This makes them potentially valuable in terms of the array of archaeological data they can yield which when analyzed can shed light on their cultural past and; third estate developers are fast encroaching the original occupation areas. Prampram, Kpone and Ningo have been continuously settled for over 400 years. However, Sega is uninhabited and desolate. The indigenes of Kpone assert in their oral traditions that Sega was their ancestral home but was abandoned sometime in the late sixteenth century because of a chieftaincy dispute between Angmo Keteku and Akpeng, sons of the chief of Sega after he had passed on. The resulting internecine conflict led to one faction deserting Sega to found a new settlement which they named Kpone (Kpone Traditional Affairs C.S.O. 21/22/1421. 1985).

Much of the European written sources presented here comprised financial statements and correspondences by Governors and Commandants of the various Danish chartered companies licensed by the Danish Crown to operate on the Gold Coast. They included Heinrich Carloff's Organization (1658 – 1659), The Danish African Company in Gluckstadt (1659 – 1673), Nikolaj Jansen Arf (1690 – 1697) the *Guineisk Kompagni* (Guinea Company, 1765 – 1776) and *Vestindisk-guineisk Kompagni* (West India and Guinea Company, 1698 – 1754). The majority of the reports were addressed to their *Direktions* (Board of Directors and Trustees) in Denmark and focused on the economic, social and political conditions of the ethnic groups and states they encountered as well as commercial / financial dealings between their establishments and the local peoples they in-dwelt. Several of these early Danish documents are preserved at the *Rigsarkivet* (the Danish National

Archives) in Copenhagen and have been translated into English by Ole Justesen (2005).

The archaeological investigations and collection of oral traditional data was coordinated and funded by the writer. Some indigenes recruited from the research area played instrumental roles in the excavations and the writer is thankful for their support. The investigations, undertaken in four phases spanned 34 days. The first phase, conducted at Sega during the summer of 2014 lasted four days. The second, third and fourth phases were carried out in the summer of the 2015 and each spanned 10 days.

### **Historical background of the Dangbe ethnic group**

The Dangbe can be divided broadly into two groups: the coastal Dangbe and inland Dangbe. The former live east of Tema and occupy four towns namely: Kpone, Prampram, Ningo and Ada. The latter lives north of the coastal Dangbe, along the foothills of the Akwapim-Togo Range. They comprise Osudoku, Manya Krobo, Shai and Yilo Krobo. Both Dangbe groups share close linguistic and cultural affiliation with the Ga who live west of them. According to Dakubu (2006), the divergence from the common parent stock occurred sometime in the eighth century A.D. The different Dangbe groups currently speak different dialects of the Dangbe language.

Much of what is known about the origins of the coastal Dangbe ethnic group is sketchy and obscure. Their ethno-historical traditions for example, assert that they migrated from external sources and that the migration was necessitated by hostility of their neighbours. Some places mentioned in these traditions include Same, Tetetutu (along the Togo-Benin border) and Yorubaland (Southern Nigeria) (Anquandah 1982: 113). According to Reindorf (1966: 47), their ancestral home was “Same a country situated between two rivers, *Efu* and *Kpola* near the Niger River”. Boahen (1977: 94) has countered the validity of these traditions. According to him:

The Ewe speak a language closely related to the Fon and Adja languages spoken in Togo and Dahomey (now Benin) while the Ga and the Dangbe and the Krobo speak virtually the same language. Not only are these four languages quite distinctive and not only are all of them spoken in clearly defined and continuous areas but with the exception of Ewe, all the other languages are spoken in Ghana and nowhere else in the world. It was therefore in Ghana that these languages evolved and nowhere else, and since it takes at least one thousand years for a language to break off a parent language and develop into a language of its own, it follows that at least some of the speakers of these languages must have been living in these regions for at least a thousand years.

Boahen (1977: 94) further argues that the Dangbe traditions may be misrepresentations down the centuries of the pre-European intra regional trade system between the coastal populations of Ghana and Nigeria involving the exchange of *quaqua* cloth, aggrey beads and slaves which spanned the late fifteenth to early sixteenth centuries. Some early European writers including Pacheco Pereira (1967) and William Bosman (1705) have documented this trade network in their writings

Current historical and linguistic evidence on their origins appear to suggest that they migrated from the Lower Volta Basin to their current locations (Boahen 1976: 94 - 95). A number of radiocarbon dates obtained from excavations at the Gao Lagoon site near Kpone for example, indicates that the area was inhabited during the first millennia A.D by Late Stone Age hunter-gatherers who exploited freshwater molluscs and made micro-lithic tools and pottery ornamented by stamping (Dombrowski 1977: 32). Anquandah (1982: 68 & 115) also notes that during the Early Iron Age and Middle Iron Ages, especially between 500 A.D. – 1400 A.D, there were expansions of several village settlements who smelted and forged iron tools. This view reinforces Oliver Davies' (1966: 20) assertion that “the stretches of savanna coast especially in Ghana may always have been open and attractive for human settlement”. Whether these early settlers in the research area were proto Dangbe populations or not is yet to be established.

All three Dangbe states, focus of this study are ancient and predated the arrival of Europeans to the Guinea Coast in the late fifteenth century. According to early European records (Barbot 1732, Bosman 1705), these early coastal populations played an important role in the Euro-African encounter which occurred along the Guinea coast during the pre-colonial era. Kpone (originally called *Ponnie*), Prampram (*Pompena*) and Ningo (*Chiabra*) were important commercial entrepots where traditional export commodities of the period (slaves, ivory, palm oil and gold) were exchanged for exquisite European merchandise (glass beads, ceramics, alcoholic beverages, textiles, guns and tobacco). Some structural remains such as fort foundations and floors with their decrepit canons are some vestiges attesting to vibrant commercial exchanges between the two groups in the past.

According to Tetteh Abladu Appiah<sup>2</sup> an elder of the *Appiah We* clan at Kpone, their past economic mainstays in order of importance were fishing, salt production, animal husbandry, crop farming and molluscs exploitation. According to Reindorf (1966: 63), “towns along the coast chiefly applied themselves to the salt making industry. Those who did it acquired great riches because the demand from the interior was constant and if peace could be attained the coastal towns could have been the most prosperous on the Gold Coast”. Barbot (1752: 186) also mentions cattle rearing as yet another important economic activity of the Kingdom of Ningo on the coast. He named *Ponnie* or *Pompone* (Kpone), Allempy, Lay, Tema, Concho, Ningo the Lesser and Occa as some principal villages of this kingdom. He intimated: The blacks of this village and the country about it drive a trade in cattle which they fatten in their pasture grounds and either the Gold Coast blacks come for it or they carry it along the said coast to Accra where they make thirty crowns of a bullock.

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<sup>2</sup> Personal Communication on 23 July, 2014.



## **The geographical setting of the research area**

The research area extends for about 55 km. from east to west on the Gulf of Guinea. Kpone which is the westernmost point is 35 km. east of Accra, the capital city of Ghana while Ada is the easternmost point. Much of the beachfront in the research area consists of flat sandy patches interspersed with large rock boulders. The entire coastline is underlain with rocks which gradually ascend northwards to about 18 – 40 m. above sea level, gradually merging with the Eastern Coastal Plain.

The majority of rock boulders on-shore are composed mainly of granite and gneiss, overlain with thin patches of mostly black calcareous clay, red laterite and occasional patches of rich loamy dark grey humus ideal for the cultivation of vegetables like tomatoes, pepper and okra. Some of the rocks extend several metres off-shore and can be seen during low tides jutting out of the sea. A few overhang sharply along the beachfront sometimes forming promontories.

The underlying rock system of the area is part of the wider Dahomeyan System. According to Wills (1962: 52), the geology consists of massive crystalline granulites and gneisses which have undergone extensive metamorphism under great pressure and migmatites, with subordinate quartz, schist, biotite schists and other sedimentary rock types constituting the remnants. Other major rock types unique to the system consist of hornblende, pyroxenes, calcium-scapolite and garnet (Kesse 1985: 9 – 10). They generally lie in a north-northeast direction and share a common dip of about 25 degrees towards the east and-southeast.

Each of the four towns is sandwiched between large lagoons. The *Laloi* Lagoon lies between Kpone and Prampram. It is very saline and can form salt crystals along the margins during the dry season which the indigenes collect and sell in the surrounding neighbourhoods. The *Moyo* Lagoon lies between Prampram and Ningo. Unlike the *Laloi* Lagoon, it is brackish, while the *Sangaw* Lagoon lies between Ningo and Ada. Several small streams flow into the above named lagoons in the wet season. During the dry season however, many form small pockets which

quickly become fast flowing streams overflowing their banks during the wet season. Owing to the relatively impervious underlying rocks of the area, rainwater does not easily penetrate the ground and generally runs off as broad sheet flood during the wet season. All the lagoons are characterized by several dense mangrove swamps which are home to several freshwater molluscs and crustaceans.


The research area experiences the Dry Equatorial type of climate which is characterized by high temperatures ranging from a maximum of about 35 degrees Celsius in March which is the hottest month to about 25 degrees in August which is the coldest month. The area experiences double maxima of rainfall annually. The first which is the major rainy season occurs from April to mid-July with the minor one being experienced between September to late November. Rainfall is generally sporadic and unreliable averaging about 800 mm. annually (Wills 1962: 166)

The vegetation in the research area differs significantly from the surrounding regions bordering it. For example, along the banks of the lagoons are several thick patches of mangroves and waterlogged swamps. Along parts of the beachfront and extending several metres off-shore can be seen vast quantities of seaweed (*Ulva lobata*), called *womogmo* by the local people. Further inland, the vegetation is dominated by open grasslands, thickets and shrubs. Many of the thicket species comprise climbers often armed with spines, occasionally these are interspersed with tree savanna. The main tree types are *Ceiba pentandra*, *Antiaris Africana*, *Albizia zygia*, *Sterculia tragacantha*, *Baphia nitida*, *Dialium guineense*, *Nauclea latifolia* and *Griffonia simplicifolia*.

### **Brief history of the Danish-Dangbe encounter along the eastern coastal belt**

Until 1685, much of the information about Danish operations on the Gold Coast related to their trade interactions with the kingdom of Fetu which had earlier helped the Danish trader Heinrich Carloff to capture

and takeover Fort Carolusborg from the Swedes at *Ogua* (Justesen 2005: xviii). The next line of reports after this encounter emanated from Fort Frederiskborg which the Danes later built on Fetu territory after signing a treaty with them. However, after relocating their headquarters to Christiansborg Castle at Osu, much of their reports now focused on their activities along the eastern coastal belt, especially the region between Osu and Ada.



Map 1. Map showing the research area, circa 1830 - 1900. (Source: *A Reliable Account of the Coast of Guinea* . [1760] by Ludewig Ferdinand Romer).

The study area was the focus of intense commercial rivalry between the Danes on one hand and the English and Dutch represented by their national charter companies on the other hand prior to 1792 when Denmark abolished slavery. This was mainly because the region had become an important commercial entrepot where traditional export commodities, especially gold, ivory and later slaves were channeled en route to Europe and the New World. Aside the national charter companies of the above named nations which were licensed by their

countries to operate there, interloper traders and seafarers of English, French, Brandenburg and Dutch origins also operated albeit secretly alongside that stretch of the Guinea coastline, a situation which greatly undermined profit margins of the national charter companies which operated there. Perhaps, nothing demonstrates this commercial rivalry better than this extract of a letter dated 8<sup>th</sup> May, 1699 from General Jan Van Sevenhuyen, the then Dutch Director-General to his counterpart at Elmina Castle. It read in part:

After the urgent request of the king of *Aqaumboe* (Akwamu), I have now encouraged the trade at *Ponnie* (Kpone) for more than one and a half years and I propose that we establish a fort or lodge there. It has provided us with very good slaves and abundant gold and it is of such importance that the English have already insisted with the upper king that he make us depart from there...as there are abundant and good slaves for sale, so many English and Portuguese ships sometimes get their entire load at the place. We could take over the trade if only we had a fort there. Moreover, much of the gold is also received there even when the passage towards Accra is closed by the upper king, because then, the other one authorizes those at *Ponnie* [Kpone] to stay open (van Dantzig 1978: 70).

The economic importance of the region was reiterated in another letter dated 10<sup>th</sup> September, 1703 by W. de la Palma, an employee of the Dutch West India Company to the Dutch Factory at Elmina. This time, it was the French seeking permission from the Akwamu king to build a fort at Kpone. Part of the letter read: "...the French sailed subsequently to Accra where they requested the king of *Aquamboe* for permission to build a fortress in his land, either at *Chabra* (Ningo) or at *Ponnie* (van Dantzig 1978: 90).

The Danes represented by their national charter companies became the principal European trading power which operated in the area after 1700. This was because contending traders of other nationalities represented by the Royal Africa Company and The Committee of Merchants Trading to

Africa (England), the Brandenburger Company (Brandenburg) and the East India Company (The Netherlands) focused their attention more on the region located further west, between Accra and Axim which had more quality gold and ivory, the two major resources in high demand by the contending nations. The Danes during this period operated from off-shore seaboards, trade lodges and forts which they had built at vantage locations to enable them secure a foothold there, promote their commercial interests and tap natural resources of the area.

There is currently no trace of the several trade lodges they built because the majority like the Kpone trade post (1701) were built with non-durable earthenware materials comprising mainly swish and mud and have succumbed to the vagaries of tropical weather conditions. However, some of the forts still stand; though desolate and decrepit by the infirmities of old age. They include Fort Venon at Prampram (1745), Fort Fredensborg at Old Ningo (1734), Tubreku trade lodge near Ada (date unknown) and Fort Kongensten at Ada (1783).

### **Review of major archaeological investigations undertaken in the study area**

Oliver Davies was the first archaeologist to conduct archaeological investigations in the research area. This was in 1961 and his study involved preliminary reconnaissance surveys at Sega and *Gao* Lagoon, all located west of Kpone township. His objective was to locate, describe and document potential sites of archaeological significance in the region for future in-depth investigation. Finds recovered included local potsherds, grinding stones, mullers, molluscs' shells and several stone blocks which he believed were house foundations (Davies 1966: 26). The main limitation of Davies work was that it was purely descriptive and his conclusions were based on surface finds only. Surface surveys give limited information about sites and the people who inhabited it. For example, the age of the site and changes in cultural life-ways over time cannot be established or reconstructed.

The second was by Paul Ozanne and the study covered two years. It involved surface surveys and archaeological excavations at Ladoku, early capital town of the Dangbe and some ancient Dangbe settlements bordering it. He recovered vast quantities of materials remains of local and foreign origins. They included veritable quantities of local and imported smoking pipes, imported ceramics, local pottery, metal objects of local and foreign origins and glass beads. Using stratigraphy dating method, he dated the site and by association the finds to 1200 – 1800 A.D. He also postulated that several relatively large and complex settlements evolved and developed along the Eastern Coastal Plain during that period (Ozanne 1962).

The above conclusions by Ozanne's are unscientific, relative and premature. For example, the data pool from which the conclusions were founded was too small and thus scientifically inconsequential. He also did not specify the geographical extent of the site to support his assertion that the early Dangbe settlements he investigated were "relatively large" neither did he define "complex settlements" leaving it to readers to guesstimate.

In 1977, Joanne Dombrowski assisted by students from the Department of Archaeology conducted reconnaissance surveys and archaeological excavations at two midden sites along the banks of the *Gao* Lagoon. Her team recovered large quantities of molluscs' shells of different species, a few Late Stone Age micro-lithic tools and local potsherds. Dombrowki asserted in her investigation report that there existed a Late Stone Age pottery using community who exploited freshwater and marine resources of the area. She also obtained two radiocarbon dates for the site which are 4180—140 B.P. and 1260---90 B.P., indicating the area was settled as far back as the Late Stone Age.

The main limitation of Dombrowski's research was that she excavated only three units, all of which were located in the same vicinity even though the site is expansive. It can thus be argued that the above assertions cannot be generalized for the entire site. Her contribution to

archaeological knowledge of the Accra Plains however can be described as creditable because the absolute dates she derived for the site are to-date the only ones available for researchers after over thirty years.

Perhaps the most outstanding of these early Dangbe investigations was that undertaken by James Anquandah from 1977–1987. His work involved gridding, reconnaissance survey and archaeological excavations at Adwuku, Ladoku, Kpoete near Prampram, Cherekecherte and other ancient Dangbe settlements on the Eastern Accra Plains. Unlike previous researchers, he employed a multi-disciplinary approach to derive data for his studies. His investigations at Ladoku, Adwuku and Cheretecherte revealed that by the fourteenth century, villages had flourished in the *Shai* and *Le* regions which developed into large townships during the first half of the seventeenth century (Anquandah 1979: 80).

Based on the large variety and quantum of material remains recovered, he concluded that the above named early Dangbe settlements were fairly large sophisticated “urban complexes” with budding economies. For example, houses were built with mud on stone slab foundations and they practices a farming system based on terracing and stone walling to curb erosion. The settlements also had elaborate systems of defense based on stone fortification systems. Similarities in body measurements of several vessel types recovered, comprising ritual bowls, jars, medicinal pots and basins with highly elegant decorative motifs also appeared to suggest that ancient Dangbe potters had achieved a high level of standardization and efficiency in their craft (Anquandah 1982: 40).

The upper stratigraphic levels at *Shai* and *Le* also yielded large quantities of exotic trade goods of foreign origins which supported his assertion that the societies were fairly complex and had conducted long distance trade with the coastal populations. The items comprised Venetian and Bohemian glass beads, Dutch and English smoking pipes, cowries (identified as *Cypraea moneta*), a wide variety of ceramics and a variety of faunal remains and molluscs which indicated the ancestors of the Dangbe practiced a mixed economy. One unique discovery at the

*Hiowe* site was a large rectangular *terre prise* palace which he speculated could have been the residence of a traditional priest or chief. Anquandah (1979: 80) postulated that “the period between the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries was the peak period of Dangbe urban and commercial development”.

Another important discovery, this time at the Ladoku hill-top site by a team of archaeologists from the Department of Archaeology led by James Anquandah revealed a circular mud incinerator with several European imports. Items retrieved included 2 pieces of blue and white German stoneware dated to the early seventeenth century, 5 pieces of pottery manufactured at Stoke on Trent and Bristol in England dated to the early nineteenth century, 4 pieces of Dutch and English clay pipes dated to between the seventeenth to early nineteenth century, hundreds of glass beads imported from Holland and Venice, and several pieces of cowrie shells belonging to *Cyraea moneta* and *Cypraea annulus* believed to have been imported from the Indian Ocean Island of Maldives and Tahiti (Anquandah 1979: 17). The above named mollusc specie types were utilized as currency in ancient times and may have served that purpose at the site where they were recovered.

### **The archaeological research at Sega**

The first phase of the archaeological research began with a surface survey at Sega Hill. It was undertaken on foot and the researcher was assisted by 3 indigenes of Kpone. This was after the *Wolomo* (Chief Priest) of Kpone had poured libation and sought the blessings of their ancestors. Two types of material remains dominated the cultural assemblage at Sega. These were local potsherds totaling 1,392 and stone slabs totaling 7,929 littered the site. The latter are believed to be remains of house foundations. Other finds recovered included fragments of imported ceramics – 5, locally manufactured smoking pipes - 2, mollusc shells (belonging to a variety of species) – 37” querns – 3, grinding stone - 1, fragments of glass bottles – 3, and unidentified metal objects - 7.



The surface survey at Sega revealed that a large portion of the original settlement quarter had been disturbed by farmers and construction activities of the contractor executing the building of a number of gas storage sub-stations for the West Africa Gas Pipeline Project. A small area littered with locally manufactured potsherds and located 21 m. northwest of the original settlement site appeared to be the only area undisturbed and was selected for excavation. The unit, designated Unit 1 measured 1 x 2 m. The types and quantum of cultural materials retrieved from Unit 1 are shown in Table 1 below.

**Table 1. Table showing the types and quantum of cultural materials retrieved from Unit 1 at Sega.**

<b>Strata Levels (cm)</b>	<b>0 - 20</b>	<b>20 - 40</b>	<b>40 - 60</b>	<b>Total</b>
Grinding stones	2	-	-	<b>2</b>
Bones	23	19	9	<b>51</b>
Glass beads	18	19	-	<b>37</b>
Imported smoking pipes	-	12	-	<b>12</b>
Locally manufactured smoking pipes	1	2	-	<b>3</b>
Imported ceramics	11	12	-	<b>23</b>
Glass bottles	17	23	-	<b>40</b>
Gaming disc	-	1	-	<b>1</b>
Stone blocks	9	7	2	<b>18</b>
Local pottery	9	21	4	<b>34</b>

### **The archaeological research at Kpone**

It was difficult to undertake a surface survey at Kpone because the original settlement quarter occupied by their ancestors was heavily built-up and convoluted. The situation was further exacerbated by garbage which littered most of the empty spaces between the houses which were connected by deep gullies and alleyways carrying effluence from bath houses and kitchens. This situation precluded the recovery of cultural material at Kpone during the surface survey.

Two Units designated Units 1 and 2 were excavated at Kpone. Unit 1 measured 1 x 2 m, while Unit 2 measured 2 x 2 m. The choice of where to dig the units was determined opportunistically by the researcher. A twenty centimeter arbitrary level was used to control vertical provenience of all the two units excavated and the northern section of each unit constituted the control points for measuring their vertical intervals. They were also named by their northern corners, and sterile levels for all two units were 60 cm. below ground surface. All the two units were located in the heart of Kpone, around the precincts of a trade lodge built by the Dutch in 1701 to facilitate exchange of gold, slaves and European trade goods in the region. Only the stone foundations of the trade lodge are currently traceable and the entire sub-surface structure is completely destroyed. The stone foundations of the trade lodge and a derelict cannon installed by the Dutch to protect the lodge constitutes the only vestiges attesting to Dutch presence in the town in the past. The types and quantum of cultural materials retrieved from the 2 units at Kpone are shown in Tables 2 and 3 below.

**Table 2: Table showing the types and quantum of cultural materials retrieved from Unit 1 at Kpone**

<b>Strata Levels (cm)</b>	<b>0 - 20</b>	<b>20 - 40</b>	<b>40 - 60</b>	<b>Total</b>
Grinding stones	1	-	-	<b>1</b>
Bones	61	39	18	<b>118</b>
Glass beads	7	19	2	<b>28</b>
Imported smoking pipes	-	11	9	<b>20</b>
Locally manufactured smoking pipes	-	-	1	<b>1</b>
Imported ceramics	4	13	2	<b>19</b>
Glass bottles	12	21	9	<b>42</b>
Metal objects	7	18	-	<b>25</b>
Stone blocks	7	3	4	<b>14</b>
Local pottery	11	9	7	<b>27</b>

**Table 3: Table showing the types and quantum of cultural materials retrieved from Unit 2 at Kpone**

<b>Strata Levels (cm)</b>	<b>0 - 20</b>	<b>20 - 40</b>	<b>40 - 60</b>	<b>Total</b>
Metal objects	4	1	-	<b>5</b>
Bones	11	9	9	<b>29</b>
Glass beads	4	3	4	<b>11</b>
Imported smoking pipes	-	-	1	<b>1</b>
Locally manufactured smoking pipes	2	-	-	<b>2</b>
Imported ceramics	-	2	1	<b>3</b>
Glass bottles	6	3	4	<b>13</b>
Local pottery	9	11	2	<b>22</b>
Stone blocks	-	2	-	<b>2</b>
Mollusc remains	12	8	9	<b>29</b>

### **The archaeological research at Prampram**

A total of two visits, undertaken on foot around the precincts of Fort Venon and the original settlement quarter at Prampram constituted the surface survey. The site had been disturbed by several human activities, principally farming and deposition of refuse by a section of the town's folks who lived close by. The situation was particularly dire along the southern portion of the fort because the area served as an open defecation area. Unlike Segua, few cultural materials were found on the ground surface. Main finds comprised potsherds of local origin - 39, unidentified metal objects - 7, fragment of imported ceramic - 1, mollusc shells (belonging to a variety of species) – 29, and faunal remains - 2.

Two units designated Unit 1 and 2 were dug at different locations around the fort where early European records intimate was settled by the local people in the past. The choice of where to dig was determined by the density of artifact scatter at those locations. The sterile level at Unit 1 reached 120 cm, while that of Unit 2 reached 80 cm. and an arbitrary level of 20 cm. was used to control vertical provenience. The types and quantum of cultural materials retrieved from the 2 units at Prampram are shown in Tables 4 and 5 below.

**Table 4. Table showing the types and quantum of cultural materials retrieved from Unit 1 at Prampram**

<b>Strata Levels (cm)</b>	<b>0 - 20</b>	<b>20 - 40</b>	<b>40 - 60</b>	<b>60-80</b>	<b>Total</b>
Molluscs shells	11	9	13	6	<b>39</b>
Metal objects	13	9	10	4	<b>36</b>
Bottles	7	13	9	1	<b>30</b>
Imported ceramics	-	1	2	-	<b>3</b>
Bones	19	11	7	13	<b>50</b>
Slate	1	1	-	-	<b>2</b>
Glass beads	17	13	29	5	<b>64</b>
Imported smoking pipes	-	2	-	1	<b>3</b>
Grinding stone	1	-	-	-	<b>1</b>
Local pottery	16	7	13	6	<b>42</b>
Shell bead	1	-	-	-	<b>1</b>

**Table 5. Table showing the types and quantum of cultural materials retrieved from Unit 2 at Prampram**

<b>Strata Levels (cm)</b>	<b>0 - 20</b>	<b>20 - 40</b>	<b>40 - 60</b>	<b>60- 80</b>	<b>80- 100</b>	<b>100- 120</b>	<b>Total</b>
Molluscs shells	6	2	4	-	2	6	<b>20</b>
Metal objects	2	6	17	13	-	1	<b>39</b>
Glass bottles	15	19	16	11	7	-	<b>68</b>
Imported ceramics	11	5	12	-	2	-	<b>30</b>
Bones	29	9	7	11	14	2	<b>72</b>
Daub	-	1	2	-	1	-	<b>3</b>
Glass beads	1	4	21	17	7	-	<b>52</b>
Imported smoking pipes	-	1	-	14	1	-	<b>16</b>
Grinding stone	-	1	-	-	-	-	<b>1</b>
Local pottery	29	31	14	9	19	5	<b>107</b>
Metal button	-	-	1	1	-	-	<b>2</b>

## **The archaeological research at Ningo**

The archaeological investigation at Ningo commenced with two surface surveys undertaken on foot around the precincts of Fort Fredensborg and another two carried out at a site currently located south of Ningo town which their oral traditions assert was the ancient settlement quarter of the ancestors of the Ningo people. Only few cultural materials comprising mainly potsherds of local manufacture and mollusc shells were found at the two sites. I noted that much of the top soil in the above named areas down to about 10 cm. below ground surface level was also friable and not compacted as the surrounding neighbourhoods. This indicated it had been extensively disturbed.

Two units designated Units 1 and 2 were opened at two locations. The first was located 27 m. west of Fort Fredensborg while the second was located 7 m. south of the fort in the area which oral traditions intimate was the original settlement area of their ancestors. Each unit measured 2 x 1.5 m. and the sterile level of both units was 120 cm. below ground surface. An arbitrary level of 20 cm. was used to control vertical provenience. The types and quantum of cultural materials retrieved from the 2 units at Ningo are shown in Tables 6 and 7 below.

**Table 6: Table showing the types and quantum of cultural materials retrieved from Unit 1 at Ningo**

<b>Strata Levels (cm)</b>	<b>0 - 20</b>	<b>20 - 40</b>	<b>40 - 60</b>	<b>60- 80</b>	<b>80- 100</b>	<b>100-120</b>	<b>Total</b>
Daub	-	1	-	-	1	2	<b>4</b>
Iron slag	-	-	5	11	3	4	<b>23</b>
Mollusc shells	21	4	11	23	6	5	<b>70</b>
Imported ceramics	1	-	12	-	4	-	<b>17</b>
Imported smoking pipes	-	1	13	17	2	-	<b>33</b>
Local pottery	15	27	35	9	13	9	<b>108</b>
Bones	11	2	31	19	6	2	<b>71</b>
Metal objects	17	11	9	11	7	-	<b>55</b>
Bottles	27	35	31	14	6	-	<b>113</b>
Glass beads	23	16	19	7	11	-	<b>76</b>
Locally made smoking pipes	2	-	-	1	-	-	<b>3</b>
Bauxite bead	-	-	3	-	-	-	<b>3</b>

**Table 7. Table showing the types and quantum of cultural materials retrieved from Unit 2 at Ningo.**

<b>Strata Levels (cm)</b>	<b>0 - 20</b>	<b>20 - 40</b>	<b>40 - 60</b>	<b>60- 80</b>	<b>80- 100</b>	<b>100- 120</b>	<b>Total</b>
Daub	-	-	2	-	-	-	<b>2</b>
Iron slag	-	3	18	26	4	7	<b>58</b>
Mollusc shells	29	13	18	7	5	2	<b>74</b>
Imported ceramics	-	1	17	12	1	-	<b>31</b>
Imported smoking pipes	1	1	2	11	-	-	<b>15</b>
Local pottery	31	29	17	21	9	4	<b>111</b>
Bones	29	39	46	15	9	9	<b>147</b>
Metal objects	13	46	21	13	3	-	<b>96</b>
Bottles	49	19	12	7	21	-	<b>108</b>
Glass beads	17	-	12	19	5	-	<b>53</b>
Writing slates	-	1	-	-	-	-	<b>1</b>

## **Discussion**

It appears from the cumulative evidence that the Atlantic trade was the economic lynch pin and probably the most profitable vocation of the people of the three coastal states during the period covered by the study. The recovery of a wide array and veritable quantities of European trade goods such as ceramics, tobacco pipes, glass beads and metal objects (mattocks, cutlasses among others) clearly attests to its importance. It is also a testament of the vibrant commercial relations which existed between the Dangbe people and the Danes. It is worth noting that even though the Danes were the dominant European trading nation operating along the eastern coastal belt, several early European records also intimated that interloper captains / traders of other nations traded there, albeit secretly on the blind side of the Danes. It is therefore likely that some of these items may have found their way there via this group of traders.

Early European documents assert that the above named imports were exchanged for traditional African commodities principally gold, ivory,

palm oil and salt. Prior to 1670, the trade in gold was the most lucrative on the Gold Coast. According to Boahen (1980: 108) and Daaku (1970: 11), the value of gold exported annually from the Gold Coast was about £10,000 which was equivalent to one-tenth of total world supply at that time. The total value / quantum of gold exported to Denmark during the study period are yet to be evaluated and quantified. However studies by Daaku indicate that in the United Provinces (Holland), almost all the gold used for coinage came from the Gold Coast. During the first 13 years of the Dutch West India Company's operations on the Gold Coast, the United Province imported about 40,461 *Marks* of gold estimated to be worth about 17,733,899 *Florins* (Daaku 1970: 14).

The period after 1670 however saw slaves becoming the most lucrative export "commodity" from the eastern coastal belt outstripping, superseding and overshadowing gold, ivory, salt and palm oil in terms of quantity and value. This was attributable to rapidly expanding plantation economies in the West Indies and America where slaves were needed to cultivate cotton, indigo and sugar and other cash crops (Drolor Bosso Adamtey 1 2007: 18; Daaku 1970: 19). According to Bosman (1705: 304), the main trade of the people of the research area "consisted in slaves which are also brought up by the mentioned Negroes (*Aquamboes*) but most of them are transported hence by English, French and Portuguese ships. Sometimes the slave trade here proves very advantageous, especially about the village of *Lay*".

According to Justesen (2005: xxxv), the price of slaves sold along the eastern coastal belt was quoted in *rđl* with an average add-up price of 100%. *Rđl (kurant)* was the currency system in Denmark during the period. Indeed, the trade in slaves was so profitable in the study area that in 1680 for example, the average price quoted for one slave was between 15 and 24 *engels* of gold. On average, about 20 *engel*, corresponded to about 11/4 ounces of gold, rising as high as 32 *rđl* at the turn of the century. The prices quoted below have been tabulated by Justesen (2005: xxxvi - xxxvii), and constitute average slave prices in the study area from 1702 – 1738. The average mark-up price during the period was

80% and it demonstrates the lucrative nature of the slave trading business in the research area. They are as follows: 1702: 50 *rdl*, 1711: 52 – 53 *rdl*, 1714: 72 – 96 *rdl*, 1714: 112 *rdl*, 1720: 100 – 120 *rdl*, 1722: 104 *rdl*, 1726: 144 – 160 *rdl*, 1732: 128 *rdl*, 1735: 120 *rdl*, 1735: 104 – 112 *rdl*, 1738: 112 *rdl*.

All the 329 glass beads recovered from the four settlements originated from Venice and Bohemia (Plate 1). This indicates that the Danes procured some of the items traded along that stretch of coastline from other countries. The bulk of the glass beads including those from lower levels were relatively well-preserved and had retained their main characteristic attributes like colours and shapes. Two types of the former were identified namely: Cane Venetian beads and *Millefiori* beads (also called mosaic beads). Many of the latter were multi-layered and multi-coloured; characterized by transverse feather trails.

Francis (1995: 64 – 65) has noted that the vast majority of *Millefiori*, mosaic and chevron beads (also called Czech beads) originated from Venice and Bohemia, and that “the earliest European beads to flood the newly discovered worlds were Venetian drawn beads ...in the 1500’s and 1600’s, hardly any other sorts of glass beads were found along the American Atlantic coast or in West Africa” (Francis 1995: 64). Their recovery in veritable numbers suggests it may have constituted an important dress accessory of the Dangbe in the past, especially the women folk as is currently the case among Dangbe populations settling the area.





Plate 1. Some imported glass beads from Sega.

Also recovered from Unit 1, Level 3 at Ningo was 3 locally manufactured bauxite beads. Two were tubular shaped, while the third was disc shaped. All were coloured reddish-brown. It was probably manufactured at Akyem Abompe which has over a century old tradition of manufacturing bauxite beads much of which was exported to other localities in Ghana (Shaw: 1945). Bauxite beads have been recovered from archaeological contexts in veritable numbers at Asebu (Nunoo 1957: 16) and Sega (Biveridge 2005: 89) and their recovery at Ningo suggests that the ancestors of the Ningo people apart from conducting brisk trade with Europeans also traded with inland populations including the people of Akyem Abompe located in the Eastern Region of Ghana.

A total of 217 pieces of metal objects comprising a variety of construction materials such as brad nails, screws, iron rods, bolts, brackets and door hinges were recovered. Other recovered items fashioned out of metal comprised parts of farm tools (cutlasses, hoes and hasps) of which 7 were registered, 1 very corroded silver spoon, the upper part of a fork, and part of the bottom of a metal basin.

The degree of corrosion on most of the construction items recovered was extensive making identification difficult and cumbersome. A few

however were positively identified; for example, some of the nails had “T” heads and appeared to have been hand forged evidenced by variations in shank thickness. The screws also appeared in a variety of shapes and sizes.

Almost 69% of metal objects found comprised objects associated with building and construction works. Most were retrieved from Ningo, around the precincts of Fort Fredensborg. This suggests the area was a hotbed of construction activity in the past. Commercial rivalry between the Dutch, Danes, Brandenburgers and English some of which culminated in attacks on each other’s forts and possessions may have been responsible for the regularity of construction activity undertaken around the fort’s precincts at Ningo. The bulk was dated to the early nineteenth to early twentieth century because by association, they were found in the same stratigraphy levels with dateable imported ceramics and Venetian and Bohemian glass beads which have been dated to that period.

A large quantity of iron slag was recovered at the pre-European contact cultural levels at Sega, Prampram and Ningo. At Ningo, the pre-European contact cultural level was 100 – 120 cm. below ground surface. At Prampram, it was 100 – 120 cm. below ground surface, while at Sega; it was 40 – 60 cm. below ground surface. The above stratigraphy levels contained only cultural materials of local origin, indicative that the three settlements predated the arrival of Europeans. However, there was no pre-European contact cultural level at Kpone because the lowest level there was 100 – 120 cm. which contained cultural materials of both local and foreign origins. Iron slag is a by product of the iron smelting process and is suggestive that the ancestors of the people of the three towns smelted iron and forged a variety of iron tools. In the light of this, it will be wrong to assign all the metal objects recovered from the excavations as European imports.

The bulk of the bottle fragments recovered consisted of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverage bottles with a small number comprising imported

glassware and illuminant covers (Plate 2). A sizable number had developed patches of patina of no identifiable shape and size along several portions of their exterior and interior surfaces and were recovered from upper stratigraphic levels of 1 – 3 at the units where they were found. A total of 72% of the glass bottle assemblage measured 2 – 6 cm. across their longest axis with the remainder measuring less than 2 cm. across.

Schnapps, gin, champagne, wine, whisky and beer bottles accounted for approximately 75.7% of glassware assemblage and comprised mainly fragmented parts like the rims, shoulders, bodies and bases. Also recovered from Unit 2, Level 4 at Ningo were two pewter caps used to cap gin and whisky bottles. The bulk consisted of transparent white bottles with a few coloured dark green, light green and brown. Only 5 fragments were lettered with some form of identification marks like trademarks and seals. They included J. H. Henkes Company (identified by ‘Star and Stork with a Worm’ trade mark), A. van den Elaarf distillery, Schiedam (Holland), Walkers Kilmarnock whisky, Kilmarnock, Ayrshire (Scotland), F.C.C (origin unknown) and Hunt Brewers (Branbury, England).

All of the above named alcoholic beverages and distilleries are located in England and The Netherlands. Their recovery at all levels of the post Atlantic contact cultural levels suggests that alcohol use was a common pastime of the Dangbe during the period. It was probably in high demand and constituted an integral import commodity of the peoples of the area. There are multiple references in historical records which intimated that liquor constituted a major European export to the Gold Coast (Feinberg 1989: 50, DeCorse 2001: 148 – 149, Bennet & Brooks 1965: 118) and this may have accounted for the high quantum of alcoholic beverage bottles recovered. According to DeCorse (2001: 159), prior to the eighteenth century, the bulk of liquor exported to the Guinea Coast was shipped in casks, large jugs and barrels with only a small number being transported in glass bottles. Glass bottles however became popular in the

eighteenth century. Chronologically, this puts the bulk of liquor bottles recovered at research areas to the post eighteenth century era.

Other items identified and classified as non-alcoholic beverages included syrup bottles, perfume containers, soda and mineral water receptacles. DeCorse (2001: 161) has noted that the nineteenth century witnessed the production of diverse bottle forms and shapes and attributes this to technological improvements in the bottle manufacturing industry. These new bottle forms became important receptacles for exotic European export items like those named above. Also identifiable among the glass bottles assemblage were 13 fragmented pharmaceutical bottles and chemical suppositories of which 3 were identified as *Kruschen salts* containers and 2 *Sloans liniment* bottles. The small number of pharmaceutical suppositories registered suggests they did not constitute an integral aspect of the traditional healthcare system of the Dangbe. It probably complemented traditional herbal preparations which ethno-historical traditions of the indigenes assert extended into antiquity.



Plate 2. Fragments of schnapps' bottles from Kpone and Ningo.

A total of 98 smoking pipes comprising mostly stems measuring 3 – 6.5 cm. long and 12 bowls were recovered from the research area. All were well-fired and relatively well-preserved with smooth well-burnished surfaces. Only 1 bowl out of the total was marked with the letter “L”, the remaining 11 and the stems were plain without established reference marks or manufacturer attribution logos. Establishing the Production Company and country of origin was thus, difficult. DeCorse (2001: 165) however has noted that the bulk of smoking pipes manufactured in England, continental Europe and America after 1800 were largely unmarked, while shapes and sizes of the bowls were also very similar. He attributed this to the demise of the Gouda pipe industry, the leading manufacturer of smoking pipes during the period which opened up the market for competitors elsewhere to step up production of the commodity for export.

Establishing the stem-bore diameters of the 98 stems recovered using an electronic digital caliper proved very useful as chronological indicators. The use of stem-bore diameter as a relative dating technique was pioneered by Harrington who applied it to British pipes in the early 1970’s. He noted that the bulk of smoking pipes manufactured in the mid-seventeenth to early twentieth century had stem-bore diameters of 1.74 – 1.99 mm. (Harrington 1978: 27 – 31).

Measurements of the stem-bore diameter of the entire smoking pipe assemblage are presented below.

<b>Total number</b>	<b>Stem-bore diameters</b>	<b>Percentage values</b>
<b>11</b>	0.062 mm.	(11.22%).
<b>8</b>	2.48 mm.	(8.16%)
<b>79</b>	1.74 – 1.99 mm.	(80.6%)

Going by the measurements shown above, the bulk of the smoking pipe assemblage should be assigned to the early nineteenth to late twentieth century because they had stem-bore diameters which corresponded to that period. On the origins of the imported smoking pipes, it is the view

of the writer that they are of English origin because according to DeCorse (2001: 165), smoking pipes manufactured in Britain dominated collections in British West Africa during the nineteenth and twentieth century's.

Like alcoholic beverages, imported smoking pipes were found at all levels of the post Atlantic contact period. This attests to their popularity as devices for smoking tobacco among the Dangbe during the period. It is also indicative that smoking pipes and probably tobacco were very likely among the first European imports to have been offered for sale along the eastern coastal belt of the Gold Coast.

No whole ceramic vessel was recovered and the entire assemblage comprised fragmented pieces with an average size of less than 5<sup>2</sup>cm. The total number retrieved was 126 and was dominated by Cream wares (82%), with Pearl wares (12%) and Stonewares (6%) following in that order (Plate 3). Compared to other coastal settlements like James Town, Elmina, Axim and Cape Coast which also traded with Europeans, the quantum of imported ceramics recovered from the research areas was significantly small.

The dominant forms comprised flat plates, semi spherical bowls, teacups and mugs. Establishing country of origin / date of manufacture was difficult on account of the small number retrieved. The majority were also heavily fragmented, unmarked and had no trade patents or company logos. Only 3 pieces (representing 2.3% of the total assemblage) were positively identified by their trademarks and company attrition marks embossed at their bases. All originated from earthenware manufacturing companies in England, specifically Staffordshire, Bristol and Chelsea. The first had a crown atop an oval-shaped trade logo which was the trademark of Booth, Thomas and Company. The second had an anchor logo, trademark of Enoch Wood and Sons. The third had the inscription "BOOTE" embossed at the base. It was most likely to have been manufactured by T. & R. BOOTE, manufacturers of different types of

earthenwares. According to Godden (1968: 43), this company, located in England had been operating since 1842.

A total of 73 fragments (representing 57.9% of total imported ceramic assemblage) were recovered inside the original settlement quarters of the indigenous populace with the remaining 53 coming from the fort's precincts. Like smoking pipes, their recovery at all levels of the stratigraphy which corresponded to the post Atlantic contact era attests to their popularity as important import commodities. The Dangbe had probably embraced European cuisines because flat plates would have been more ideal devices for serving European dishes like rice and potatoes which are normally served with dry gravies. Local staples like millet and yams, and later Portuguese introductions such as maize (banku, kenkey) and cassava (fufu) on the other hand were consumed with soups which required deep seated bowls to conveniently serve. It would thus, not be out of place to suggest that the adoption of European cuisines probably facilitated and necessitated the adoption and utilization of European ceramics in the study area.



Plate 3: Fragments of imported European ceramics from Segha and Ningo.

A total of 3 fragments of slate pencils were recovered from the research area. All were confined to upper stratigraphy levels namely; Levels 2, Unit 2 at Ningo and from Levels 1 and 2, Unit 2 at Prampram. The recovery of writing slates around the fort's environs suggests that the Danes documented much of their daily activities with the indigenous Dangbe people of the area. It is also probable that some form of instructional education involving writing may have been undertaken inside the two forts in the research area. Similar artifacts related to writing and Western education have been recovered from Cape Coast, Ussher Fort, Elmina, Dixcove and Axim whose inhabitants also interacted with Europeans.

Documentary evidence from the above sites indicates that mullatoes and children of wealthy African merchants were educated in commerce, Christianity and plantation economics among others. This may have been replicated in the study areas. The writing slates were found together with imported ceramics, between levels 1 – 3 which are currently undisturbed. The bulk of the latter have been dated to the late nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century; the writing slates should therefore be assigned to that period.

A total of 232 shellfish remains were found at the research area (Plate 4). They comprised the shells of a variety of mollusc species of which the majority were identified as belonging *Arca senelis*, *Arca afra* and *Pecten*. Also recovered were a few species belonging to the terrestrial specie *Tympantonus fuscata*. Their large numbers is significant because it is indication that molluscs' exploitation was central in the local subsistence economy. It also constituted an integral aspect of daily diet of the Dangbe and Danish settlers.





Plate 4: Mollusc species retrieved from the research area.

The recovery of 548 bones belonging to a variety of domesticated and undomesticated animal species also attests to the importance of animal husbandry / hunting in the study area. Some animal species identified include the *femur*, *humerus*, *tibia*, *radius*, *metapodials* of grasscutter (*Thryonomys swinderianus*), goat (*Capra sp.*), sheep (*Ovis aries*), cane rat (*Cricetomys gambianus*), and cow (*bos*).

Several *Pisces*, *Replilia* and *Aves* remains were also identified among the bones retrieved. Numerically, *Pisces* constituted the second most exploited after *Mammalia* while *Replilia* was the least exploited. However, unlike the mammalian remains, the bulk could not be easily identified because of their very fragmented nature. The few which were positively identified comprised the heads and vertebrae columns of *Alecti alexandrines*, *Caranx crysos*, *Prionoce glauca*, *Istiophorus albicans*, and *Decapterus rhonchus* all of which are on-shore species. Some of the principal off-shore species identified included *Arius heudeloti* and *Clarias gariepinus*, all of which are still extensively exploited by the local people. Their recovery is germane because it clearly attests to the exploitation of freshwater and marine resources in the past. Regarding fishing, Jean Barbot (1992: 519) who documented several subsistence strategies and aspects of the cultural life-ways of

indigenous populations on the Gold Coast asserted that: “After that of merchant, the trade of fishermen is the most esteemed and commonest. Fathers bring up their children up to it from the age of nine or ten”. John Barbot (1732: 185) also affirmed its importance when he asserted that “*Cincho* (Sega) is five leagues east of Accra, a place resorted to from the beginning of the last century, tho’ now the inhabitants apply themselves to fishing to supply the market at Spice, which is a large town up the inland, for which they pay no duty to the king”.

The large quantum of faunal remains retrieved (*Mammalian, Pisces, Reptilian, Aves* and *Mollusca*) is clear testament of their primal dietary importance and extensive exploitation among the peoples of the four coastal communities. Several reportage on the coastal trade posit that Europeans procured much of their local food supplies from the communities they indwelt. Wulff (Winsnes 2004: 20) for example, intimated that it was the custom of the Danes that after their early morning stroll on the batteries of the castle, “they take tea frequently accompanied by roasted yams, plantains and bread” which was made from grounded maize. Other notable traditional consumables he named as regularly procured from the locals included “coconut milk, bananas, oranges, pawpaw’s, melons, yams, cassava, lemons, limes or *eorikker* (citrons) (Winsnes 2004: 60). Wulff further noted that lemons and lime were used by the Danes to rub their entire bodies during their early morning baths after which they washed themselves with water (Winsnes 2004: 68, 71). Fish, meat and shellfish were probably other important constituents of these exchanges because a large proportion of faunal remains retrieved from the forts and its immediate environs comprised mammalian, fish and shellfish remains. These regular exchanges and direct interactions between the two groups were probably the most important factors which facilitated cross cultural contact between the two groups in the past.



Plate 5: One of several ancient European styled houses constructed with stone blocks / bricks.



Plate 6: One European styled one storied structure in the research area. (This house is said to be over two hundred and fifty years old).

## **Conclusion**

The combined evidence (archaeological, historical and ethno-historical) appears to suggest that ancestors of the Dangbe who occupied the research area in the past adopted aspects of Danish cultural life-ways and material culture. The retrieval of veritable quantities of imported ceramics, buttons, metal objects and smoking pipes, at the ancient indigenous settlement quarters of the three towns is clear indication that they embraced European cuisine, dress codes, tools and leisure pastimes like smoking tobacco though pipes. The structural remains of ancient indigenously owned European styled houses, built with imported mortar held bricks / square stone blocks, and laid course by course is also clear attestation of the adoption of European architecture. The two Danish

trade posts, Forts Venon and Fredensborg facilitated cross cultural contact between the two groups and served as the principal catalyst which boosted the Atlantic trade in the region.

### **Recommendations**

The importance of the three ancient European trade stations named in the study to the promotion of historical tourism in the area cannot be over-emphasized. There is thus the urgent need for The Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (G.M.M.B), the statutory body responsible for safe guarding and maintaining national monuments in the country to initiate a project to rebuild / restore these vestiges of the early Dangbe-Danish encounter, in the light of the current on-going environmental degrading activities of the people of the area. The original architectural plans of these structures are preserved at the *Rigsarkivet* and referencing them can provide useful information/ guidelines towards their reconstruction. In the absence of funding, erection of barbed wire fencing around the precincts of the forts to curb the activities of trespassers can be initiated. After reconstruction, one room inside each fort can be refurbished into a small museum where the artifacts recovered from the excavations can be displayed to educate tourists who visit the sites on the nature of Dangbe-Danish cross cultural contacts during the Atlantic contact period. If well-planned and executed, the project can generate income for the G.M.M.B in the future.

In the light of the current convoluted settlement pattern at the three towns, the use of a ground probing device like a proton magnetometer in future investigations can prove useful. This is because it can reveal archaeological data buried under houses and also facilitate the discovery of new sites bordering the original settlements which are presently unknown to the local people.

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## **BOOK REVIEWS**

**Peter K. Sarpong**, *Odd Customs. Stereotypes and Prejudices*. Sub-Saharan Publishers, Accra, 2012, 84 pages, ISBN 978-9988-647-47-6.

In this book Peter K. Sarpong examines some strange customs, institutions and practices that are found among the different ethnic groups in Ghana. He also elaborates on inter-ethnic stereotypes, prejudices and misconceptions among Ghanaians, with particular reference to the Asante of Central Ghana. Some of these odd customs such as female circumcision, widowhood rites, witchcraft and magical beliefs have been widely condemned by human rights groups and proscribed by Ghanaian as well as international laws and conventions. Other controversial institutions that he dilates upon include the issue of the division of labour in Asante society, child labour in the cocoa industry, multiple marriages, funeral rituals, ancestor veneration and the practice of pouring libation.

Peter K. Sarpong is no ordinary person. He is an influential personality, an oxford-trained anthropologist, a respected theologian and an Emeritus Archbishop of the Catholic Church whose views carry weight in the Ghanaian society. Therefore, whatever his opinions are on these controversial issues do matter to a lot of people. Right from the onset, he makes it quite clear to the reader that the purpose of the book is not to defend these practices, but rather to attempt to understand them from the perspectives of those who practice them. Peter Sarpong is of the conviction that although these practices are generally deemed to be cruel, outmoded, senseless, annoying and meaningless, they cannot just be wished away, condemned and the practitioners described as being backward. Instead he calls for a different approach. Rather than assessing these practices from our standpoint, we should do so from the perspectives of the actors. We should therefore try to understand the genesis of these practices, the meanings attached to them by the groups and why these practices and institutions have been so resilient. Furthermore, when we as outsiders realize that some traditions have to

be changed “we do not employ our own means of change, but that we use the method of explanation and conviction” (page 6). Thus, by using a more sympathetic approach, we will be in a better position to convince those still engaged in these practices that they can alter the degrading aspects of the practices or abolish them altogether without doing themselves and their society much harm.

Peter Sarpong also reminds the reader that though most of his examples come from amongst the Asante (a group he is very familiar with), the practices exist among other ethnic groups in Ghana and beyond. He states categorically therefore that “this book is not an apologia for Asante; it is much less an accusation against other people; it is not written in the spirit of superiority complex” (page vii). Bishop Sarpong, in so doing, anticipates and deflects in a nice way the skepticisms, suspicions and criticisms that usually accompany any piece of writing on sensitive issues such as stereotyping, prejudices, relations between Asante and their neighbours, northerners in Asante and indeed, inter-ethnic relations in Ghana, particularly when this is written by an Asante or from an Asante perspective.

Besides the prologue and introduction, the book is divided into three chapters. The first chapter deals with four of the strange practices and institutions, namely, female circumcision, widowhood rites, witchcraft and magical beliefs and the human person. First, the author rejects the use of the pejorative but popular term “female genital mutilation” to describe the practice involving the excision of the clitoris or the labia of a female and prefers the term clitoridectomy or labiadectomy. He reminds the reader that for those who practice it, it has nothing to do with mutilation; it is not intended to render the woman sexually rigid in order to prevent infidelity on her part as is widely speculated among certain groups. Instead, it is the female counterpart of male circumcision and is meant to usher the initiand into the society of adult womanhood. Though it appears bizarre, cruel and inhuman, clitoridectomy or labiadectomy performs a very important function in society. Sarpong argues that although the “practice should disappear, the method of

getting rid of the practice is not by condemning it, as if it is being done by ignoramuses who only delight in mutilating the secret parts of their children". Rather, it is to be "fought" by politely and understandably explaining the lack of utility about it. The key to its abolition is not condemnation but understanding and persuasion.

With regard to widowhood rites, Peter Sarpong rejects the assertion that it is a means through which men in society dominate women but rather a religious rite which seeks to sever the bond between the deceased husband and the wife and meant to free the widow from the tyranny and jealousy of the dead partner. It is thus done in the interest of the widow! Again, he argues that the solution to this inhuman practice lies not in its abolition, instead, since it is a religious practice, widows and the societies still engaged in the practice have to be "convinced that dead husbands have no power of the type attributed to them". Similarly, Sarpong argues that "witchcraft and magical beliefs... are so entrenched in people's ethos that they can hardly ever be wiped out" (page 17). The belief in witchcraft enables people to understand events or occurrences which otherwise would have been inexplicable. Therefore, instead of condemning a phenomenon deeply engrained in a people's religious worldview, a better approach would be to patiently explain that the extraordinary powers attributed to witches and wizards cannot harm anyone who believes in the power of God.

On the human person, Sarpong explains why the practice of killing infants with deformities was widespread amongst many ethnic groups in Ghana. Furthermore, he explains why multiple births were also highly cherished in some groups and abhorred in others and makes suggestions on how to bring understanding to bear on what is considered to be abnormal births and increase people's acceptance for them rather than kill or reject them.

Chapter two deals with stereotypes, prejudices and misconceptions in Ghanaian society. Here, the author asserts that the commonly-held regional polarization of ethnic groups into "northerners" and

“southerners” is a myth. He explains the etymology of words such as *Tani*, *pepeni*, *sremufoo*, *ntafoo* which are commonly used in Asante and generally considered to be derogatory as innocuous and non-derogatory terms. He then goes to elaborate on the “close and friendly historical relationship” between the Asante and neighbouring ethnic groups in Ghana including the Sefwi, Gonja, Dagomba and other Akan groups. Sarpong, in so doing, comes to the defense of the Asante and rejects claims that the Asante demanded slaves, looked down upon or ill-treated neighbouring groups in the past. He further rejects claims that the Asante are “belligerent, bellicose, violent and war mongers” and instead explains the phrase *Asante Kotoko, Kum Apem a Apem Beba* (Asante the Porcupine, Kill a Thousand and a Thousand More will Emerge) as expressing “their wish for peace with their neighbours and for non-violence in their relations with others. At the same time, they are warning the neighbours to leave them alone because they have a mechanism of self-defence, whose efficacy has been demonstrated in their history to be flawless” (page 49).

The major themes handled in the third chapter include the division of labour, the issue of child labour in the cocoa industry, multiple marriages, funeral celebrations and pouring of libation. Just as in previous chapters, Peter Sarpong expounds these traditional practices and institutions from the perspective of the groups which practice them and accounts for their continued existence. He laments the recent changes introduced into the celebration of funerals many of which are rendering the institution meaningless because they take away from them the symbolic cultural aspect. He also defend the contentious practice of pouring libation by describing libation as a kind of prayer, a way of speaking to God and explains its practices, uses and relevance in traditional religion. According to Peter Sarpong, instead of condemning and demonizing the practice of prayer through libation as many Christian denominations do, we should take the positive aspects of it as it performs a very important function for us.

The book ends with an epilogue in which Peter Sarpong again justifies why he has written the book with only very few references to the works of others. He claims to be an Asante, born and bred in Asanteland and has written about events he has experienced since his childhood days, witnessed a number of them himself, has been told about these practices and institutions and has also read about these themes from a few great writers. He knows these practices and therefore “I do not need any book to tell me this” (page 79).

Peter Sarpong has done an excellent job of elucidating some of the controversial customs, practices and institutions in Ghanaian society. In a typical social anthropological fashion, he adopts an “insider” perspective and contrasts their views with those of the “outsiders” who are often quick to condemn cultural practices without first understanding their origins, their relevance and why these practices persist although they have been legally proscribed. He does not seek to justify these inhuman practices, but like the Christian and humanist that he is, calls for patience and understanding and above all a careful and sympathetic approach in explaining the non-utility of these socio-cultural and religious practices to those still engaged in them. Sarpong does not shy away from explaining and defending his viewpoints while admitting that they may not necessarily be popular.

Although he does not explicitly say so, Peter Sarpong's approach is essentially functionalist in nature. Cultural practices and institutions of a group are seen as integrative and relevant and do serve a purpose to members of the society and are essential to the sustenance of the group. Despite the usefulness of the functionalist approach, it has some drawbacks. The analysis remains at the general level. It does not explain how individuals or sub-group members benefit or are oppressed by age-long cultural practices. It also does not account for the power dynamics in society, in terms of the origins of a cultural or religious practice, whom they benefit or disadvantage? Sarpong also glosses over the fact that traditional Ghanaian (including the Asante) societies were and remain largely gerontocratic and patriarchal. It is important to keep these

in mind when analyzing the cultural practices and institutions of any ethnic group.

In the chapter dealing with stereotypes, prejudices and misconceptions (Chapter 2) Peter Sarpong is too quick to come to the defence of the Asante. Rather than accept historical facts as documented by several scholars, he adopts a revisionist approach and creates the impression that Asante attitude and behaviour towards northerners as revealed in expressions such as “*ntafuo*”, “*mpepefuo*”, “*esremufuo*” etc. was neutral and benevolent. Indeed, despite the interethnic marriages between some Asantes and northerners and the provision of jobs to the latter on (cocoa) farms, mines, and menial work in Asante towns, the ordinary Asante looked down on northerners and the relationship between the two groups was rather a master-servant one. The inferiority-superiority complex that characterized the relationship between the two groups for several centuries should not be denied.

The depth of knowledge and information displayed by the author is profound. He displays an erudite familiarity with Asante traditions and institutions. He presents his views convincingly and forcefully in a very sympathetic manner. He does not shy away from defending his position on controversial issues. Nevertheless, it is his non-appreciation of the nature of and essence of academic scholarship that is most disturbing. He brags about not requiring any academic references or the need to consult other authors on Asante tradition and institutions “when I was writing about my own people and their life which I had lived myself” (page viii). Here, Peter Sarpong is rather mistaken and ill-advised. The Asante, just as all other groups, are a diverse people and their cultural practices and institutions, though broadly similar, nevertheless vary from one area to the other. These practices also change with time. It is when we read and critique the works of prominent “insider” and “outsider” researchers such as R. S. Rattray, Meyer Fortes, K. Abrefa Busia, Jean Allman, Kwame Arhin, J. B. Danquah, to mention only these few, that we get a total picture of the cultural practices of the Asante, or rather the Akan group. If Peter Sarpong had consulted the works of prominent scholars

such as Albert Adu-Boahen, Carl Reindorf, John K. Fynn, R. Addo-Fening, A. E. A. Asiamah, Ivor Wilks, Hugo Huber and many others, he would have known that as a result of the frequent wars and raids on the neighbours, the desire for resources (such as slaves, labour, kola, gold, salt, etc.) and to control trading routes and markets, Asante for long periods had strained and fractious relations with most of its neighbours including the Bono, Fante, Akyem, Kwahu, Ga, Krobo, Gonja and others. Indeed, it was the defeat of Asante by the British in 1874 that finally liberated these groups from Asante domination and hegemony.

The book is short, well written and easy to read. The author does not describe in detail the odd customs and institutions as practiced among the Asante or other ethnic groups. He was very careful not to infringe on the sensibilities of others, preferring instead to concentrate on the main arguments. The chapters are well linked with each other and Peter Sarpong succeeds in maintaining the interest of the reader throughout the book. Every reader will find aspects of this book very informative, interesting and challenging. I highly recommend it to the general reader.

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*Investigative Journalism: Proven Strategies for Reporting the Story.* By William C. Gaines. Washington: CQ Press, 2008, 342 pages. ISBN 978-0-87289-414-3 (alkaline paper).

What is investigative journalism? The Cambridge Dictionary defines it as “a type of journalism that tries to discover information of public interest that someone is trying to hide”. How a reporter achieves success in this type of journalism is the subject of this book by William C. Gaines. He makes the bold claim in the title that the strategies he shares have been tried and tested, implying that they will work for anyone who applies them correctly. William Gaines’ contribution to *Investigative Journalism* can best be described as a handbook for aspiring and practising investigative journalists. Again, it can carefully be described as a comprehensive exploration of the workings of the practice of investigative journalism and a step-by-step guide to a successful practice, beyond the intrinsic. Gaines has called the craft many things, including unique. For him, investigative journalism has its roots in good literature and story-telling skills that developed over the years to become what is regarded as an independent overseer of government and a public service.

Far beyond these gains, we encounter investigative journalists as role models within the ambit of journalism. They are strategists, researchers, leaders, students, to mention a few. As Gaines notes, their craft goes beyond matters in the public domain. In fact, they expose the twaddle of the powerful in a bid to protect the powerless while putting their own lives and careers on the line.

In the preface, the author indicated that the desire to write the book stems from the rise of investigative reporting from a peripheral subject to mainstream journalism and the urge by his students to make available to them, workable instructions for the twenty-first century. *Investigative Journalism: Proven Strategies for Reporting the Story* is structured to cover all the major topics of investigative journalism with a flavour of a collection of short stories illustrating the day-to-day life of an investigative reporter. This style of writing breathes life into the subject

and makes the book stand out when compared to other books covering the same subject.

The book contains twelve chapters. The first 4 chapters deal with the characteristics of an investigative journalist, tips on how to successfully pitch stories, strategies on how to investigate people, places or entities, and how to use online resources during an investigation. Chapters 5 to 11 deal with various issues that are of interest to the investigative journalist: public safety officers, the police, nonprofit organizations, the government, consumer fraud, healthcare and businesses. Chapter 12 offers tips for investigating a range of issues such as religious scandal, nepotism in business, labor unions and even school lunches. Each chapter is illustrated with case studies based on reconstructions of actual investigations. The entire chapters end with summaries to recap what was treated as well as deepen understanding of the issues with suggested assignments at the end of each chapter to provide the reader practical hands-on approach.

The greatest strength of the book is the case study method used to illustrate the various facets of investigative journalism. The cases allow the reader to, in effect, follow the reporter around and observe how investigations are carried out. The numerous case studies paint a realistic picture of investigative reporting and do indeed offer several tips, methods and strategies for uncovering the stories in investigative reporting. The reader is also encouraged to think critically about decisions in the investigative journalism process. The author answers key questions in each case from opposing viewpoints before revealing what action needs to be taken. This device, used repeatedly, conveys the message that an investigative journalist needs to constantly evaluate the process in order to conduct a successful investigation. The case studies also include examples of how not to conduct investigative reporting with the recurring example of a journalist who consistently gets things wrong. His approach and conduct contrast with another character that shows the reader the ideal approach.

However, the book could have benefited from a chapter devoted to issues of personal safety. As investigative journalism, as broadly conceived, tries to discover information of public interest that someone, very often the powerful in society, is trying to veil, it would have been insightful for the author to share some strategies on risk, security and safety assessment and management. For instance, in Ghana, investigative journalist, Anas Aremeyaw Anas (and, to a lesser extent, his *Tiger Eye* team) cowers themselves from public recognition for fear of reprisal. According to *Global Investigative Journalism Network*, over one thousand journalists have been killed because of their work since 1992. How does a journalist make a risk assessment during an investigation? What considerations come into play concerning going undercover? These and other personal safety and security issues were not treated in the book.

In spite of this shortcoming, *Investigative Journalism: Proven Strategies for Reporting the Story* more than fulfills the promise it makes in its title. It is a well-written book by an award-winning investigative reporter and journalism educator who gives the reader the benefit of his rich experience in the field. Its organisation with an emphasis on case studies and assignments makes it a highly recommended book for media practitioners and students. It is a useful primer for budding investigative reporters and serves as a resource for media practitioners working on political and social scopes.

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## **NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS AND CALL FOR PAPERS**

The Ghana Social Science Journal (GSSJ) publishes a peer reviewed research for domestic, regional and in international audiences covering scholarly work in terms of: analysis, theory, measurements and empirical enquiry in all aspects of social science scholarship. Contributions are encouraged from all fields which have relevant and insightful comments involving social, economic, political, cultural, health, environmental and spatial dimensions of society and their implications for Social Science scholarship as broadly conceived. The Editor invites prospective authors to submit manuscripts (articles and book reviews) for possible publication in this international journal. The Journal is published twice a year in June and December.

### **1. Manuscript Requirements**

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